Territorial Consolidation After Rebel Victory: When does Civil War Recur?

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Abstract

Rebel victors of civil war face existential threats both internally and externally. In consolidating territorial control, how do rebel victors respond to domestic armed challengers? Do such decisions determine civil war recurrence? We argue in this paper that rebel victors can manage domestic risk and consolidate state power by either repressing or coopting challengers. Cooption strategies can range from the less inclusive, such as unilateral changes to the constitution and elite powersharing arrangements, to the more inclusive, such as signing peace agreements and negotiated constitutional reform. While repression and non-inclusive cooption strategies increase chances of civil recurrence, consensus-based strategies of state consolidation, such as negotiated constitutional reform, reduce repeat civil wars. We find evidence for our argument in newly configured data on cases of rebel victory since the end of the Cold War (1989-2015).

Keywords: rebel victory; conflict recurrence; powersharing; peace agreement; constitutional reform

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Introduction

How will the Taliban govern after their second victorious takeover of the Afghan state? Will they continue fighting with insurgent groups, such as the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan, or coopt them into a new governing coalition? Despite facing intense international pressure and fighting for international recognition, the principal challenge of rebel winners comes from within state boundaries in the form of threats to total territorial control (Walter 2015; Radil and Flint 2013; Liu 2021). Having won the war, rebel-rulers do not have to strike deals or engage in compromise with other social and political forces to gain control of the capital. Nevertheless, rebel victories are often contested by domestic challenges, creating the conditions for conflict recurrence. Can the rebel regime's governance strategies explain civil war recurrence? While inclusionary political strategies reduce chances of civil war recurrence (Call 2012), it is not clear what kind of inclusionary behavior prevents repeat civil wars in rebel incumbencies.

Civil wars recur due to factors distinguishable from those attributed to conflict onset (Call 2012; Gonzalez-Vicente 2018). Bracketing the impact of conflict termination type on civil war recurrence, this paper engages with the emerging debate on the political and military behavior of rebel incumbents (Lyons 2016a; Young 2020; Cunningham and Loyle 2021; Liu 2021; Martin 2022). Rebel incumbents face significantly different challenges to their rule than governments victors of civil war. Rebel victories are more akin to revolutions and coup d'états, with a new set of actors gaining the monopoly of the use of force. Unlike revolutions, however, rebel victors do not enjoy broad social support. Similar to rebel victories, coups beget coups and regimes established through coups often see more coups (Gassebner, Gutmann, and Voigt 2016). Having seized power from the *ancien* regime, rebel incumbents are more vulnerable than government

victors and more prone to facing new insurgents, attempting to grab the newly gained, vulnerable power.[3]

Previous studies have explained post-war events as legacies of war dynamics (Huang 2016; Stewart 2021; Martin 2022; Sharif 2023). While wartime factors should not be discounted, we argue post-war governance is crucial for civil war recurrence. Daly (2022) has recently shown that citizens are often ready to forgive wartime violence and vote for rebel parties with the hope of achieving post-conflict peace. We thus suspect how rebel incumbents govern may be more salient in citizens' decision to re-challenge the government. In this paper, we take a rationalist approach to rebel regime behavior, explaining that the decision to coopt new enemies of the state through consensus-based processes reduces instances of armed conflict, preventing civil war recurrence and allowing rebels to consolidate territorial control.[4] Rebuilding a state after it has almost failed (the hallmark of rebel victory), while gaining territorial authority and legitimacy, requires consensus-based governance strategies that do not find substitution through repression or foreign support.

We define rebel victory as any civil war culminating in extra-legal seizure of central authority, either by non-state armed forces or factions of the state armed forces that followed civil conflict. Analyzing cases of rebel victory since the end of the Cold War, we identify a typology of governance choices employed by rebel incumbents to consolidate state power in the face of insurgency. Based on qualitative evidence, we argue that victorious rebel rule is more politically stable when former rebels settle conflicts with new or existing insurgencies through negotiated

[3] Adopting the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) definition, we refer to insurgencies as organized armed domestic challengers to state control, which might have existed during the war as rivals of the winning rebel group or could develop in response to rebel victory, either as a defecting faction of victors or a mobilized section of dissident population (Gleditsch et al. 2002).

[4] Civil war recurrence refers to instances of armed conflict between the rebel government and insurgent groups.

constitutional reform.[5] We find evidence for our theoretical argument in an originally reconfigured dataset of victorious rebel rule (1989-2015). Our findings show that repression increases chances of civil war recurrence, while consensus-based cooption strategies, such as negotiated constitutional reform, reduce the probability of renewed conflict. This finding highlights the difference between rebel victory and other kinds of conflict termination: building legitimacy, authority, and sovereignty over newly gained state territory requires inclusive reform of state institutions that rebels had contested during the war. Our empirical analysis also demonstrates that international sanctions and arms embargoes do not have a significant direct impact on chances of repeat conflict.

Our theory substantiates previous theories of civil war recurrence, predicating renewed conflict not on conflict type but on changes in the country's post-conflict political institutions. The paper advances the field of civil war research in two ways. First, it theorizes strategies that rebel incumbents can use to minimize the ongoing and latent risks of armed opposition. Second, it distinguishes between various cooption strategies - based on how extensively they include rival input - demonstrating that only consensus-based cooption strategies prevent renewed conflict. The findings substantiate Barnett's (2006) notion of republican peacebuilding, which focuses on deliberation and constitutionalism, as well as Walter's (2015) call to the international community to establish institutional constraints to executive power in countries engulfed in repeat civil wars.

The Literature on Rebel Victory

Theories of civil war recurrence have engaged extensively with the civil war outcome typology and how the three identified outcomes – government or rebel victory, peace or ceasefire agreement,

[5] We interchangeably use the term civil conflict, armed conflict, and civil war.

or low intensity conflict – determine a country's post-conflict political development (Licklider 1995; Toft 2010). Prior to the publication of the UCDP conflict termination data (Kreutz 2010), rebel victories were shown to be less associated with civil war recurrence than government victories (Quinn, Mason, and Gurses 2007; Toft 2010). Analyses based on the UCDP data, however, demonstrate that rebel victories do not prevent the rise of new insurgencies and are not as peaceful as previously theorized (Kreutz 2018; Caplan and Hoeffler 2017; Quinn, Joshi, and Melander 2019). Most rebel victories experience organized, armed domestic challenges to their rule, which they must respond to in order to maintain power and consolidate control over territory.

Government victories are more stable than rebel victories and victorious rebels are more likely to be challenged by domestic forces because of two reasons: incentives to change the status quo and the state's weak political and economic institutions (Walter 2015; Caplan and Hoeffler 2017). First, rebel victory manifests latent conflicts, emboldened by the motivation to replicate the rebel win, i.e., if state institutions were weak enough to fall in the first place, they might be susceptible to conquest a second time. Second, rebel victory almost always happens due to a state's weak economic, military, and political institutions; thus, rebels mostly inherit weak states that already have conditions ripe for rebellion (Mason et al. 2011). Political institutions that rebels inherit are likely to have neither the monopoly over the use of force, nor the capacity to provide basic provisions to citizens, creating incentives to question the legitimacy and capacity of rebel incumbents and militarily challenge their rule (Enterline and Greig 2008).

Rebel incumbents must rebuild state institutions weakened during the war (Toft 2010), while facing opposition from existing insurgencies or potential rebellions by groups that did not side with the rebels during the war. Unlike previous assumptions that decisive rebel victory leads to stable state control, comparative studies of rebel regimes reveal that some rebel victors form

powerful postwar parties, while others fragment to form competing insurgencies and fail to govern the state (Lyons 2016b). Consolidating post-war power depends on the extent to which victorious rebels decide to repress their rivals (who might be from the defeated regime and their external allies) or redistribute to their supporters the old regime's assets and political positions in new powersharing arrangements (Mason et al. 2011; Young 2020).

Responding to insurgencies, rebel victors' initial political and military decisions establish critical precedents, norms, and organizational frameworks, channeling the transition in either a stable or unstable direction (Lyons 2016a). Opposition groups do not act alone, but are part of anti-government networks, interacting, cooperating, and competing with other domestic opponents (Metternich et al. 2013). The harder the government makes it for dissenters to cooperate with insurgents, the weaker insurgents will be in their military capacity to start or reignite a civil conflict. When anti-government actors free ride, it becomes more difficult for the antigovernment networks as a whole to engage in military conflict with the government (Metternich et al. 2013). Alternatively, high levels of repression against the population can lead to further grievances, encouraging sympathies for the insurgents' cause and tipping the cost-benefit considerations towards joining or supporting insurgents (Young 2013).

In light of what the existing literature highlights as challenges and choices of rebel incumbents, below we introduce our theory of rebel victor governance strategies in the aftermath of civil conflict. We draw empirically testable hypotheses to explain recurrence of civil war with new or existing insurgencies.

Rebel Incumbent's Governance Strategies and Recurrence of Conflict

Rebel victory almost always happens due to a state's weak economic, military, and political institutions (Reno 1997). Prior research suggests that rebel group features are salient for internal

cohesion within rebel movements (Pearlman 2008), with their relative power making rebel victory more likely (Krause 2014; Cunningham et al. 2009). As such, while rebel victory mostly takes place in weak states, victorious rebels are relatively strong and internally cohesive. In other words, victorious rebel groups start the state consolidation process with a degree of structural and ideological hegemony or cohesiveness. This leads to regime resilience in the face of internal and external challenges. In the majority of cases, rebel victors manage to maintain either a stable or unstable hold on power, depending, as we argue, on the strategies they adopt when facing domestic insurgents.[6]

Following rebel victory, institutional weakness and economic instability create incentives for insurgencies to attempt to change the new status quo. Rebel incumbents have incentives to govern differently from the erstwhile regime, when faced with organized armed groups. How rebel incumbents respond to domestic challengers determines whether the country experiences peace or renewed civil war. Our argument starts with the assumption that, faced with new rebellions, rebel victors can either repress or coopt rivals to consolidate their newly gained territorial and political power. Figure 1 shows a typology of rebel regime behavior when facing opposition. Rebel incumbents can choose among four cooption strategies, depending on the extent to which they are willing to include rival input in consensus-based processes, thus diversifying their ruling coalition and guiding ideology. The four strategies include (1) unilaterally reforming the constitution, (2) forming elite pacts to diversify powersharing, (3) signing peace accords with insurgents, and (4) agreeing on constitutional reform through a peace process. These strategies lie on a consensus

[6] Out of twenty-three cases of rebel victory since the Cold War, only six rebel regimes lost power in the face of either domestic challenges or international interventions. These include rebel regimes in the Comoros (1989-1998), Paraguay (1989-2008), Somalia (1991-2000), Haiti (1991-1994), Afghanistan (1992-1995), and again Afghanistan (1996-2001). All the six rebel regimes lost power within the first ten years of incumbency. Thus, in most observations in our dataset, rebel regimes were resilient and insurgencies did not manage to oust the rebel incumbents.

scale: the first includes the least amount of input from the dissenting population or groups, while the last incorporates dissenting views. The second part of our argument examines the impact of repressive or cooptive strategies on renewed conflict. We argue that coopting rival insurgent groups through consensus-based strategies reduces chances of engaging in conflict, while opting for repression increases the likelihood of renewed civil conflict.

Figure 1. Rebel incumbent strategies in the face of domestic opposition

Our argument is agnostic to whether insurgencies exist at the time of rebel victory or emerge later. Regardless, victorious rebels face challenges in consolidating state authority. Rebel regimes may respond differently to different groups but, in the long run, they learn and adapt. If coopting one insurgency through a consensus-based process stops it from militarily challenging the government, the rebel regime learns and attempts to follow the same strategy with other groups, impacting the eventual control of the national territory. Post-conflict multi-insurgency environments are very complex. It is conceivable that a powersharing agreement with one group and repression of the other makes the first group distrust the government and remobilize at an opportunistic moment. When the government keeps the promises made to the signatories in a previous negotiated agreement in a consensus-based process, the risk of subsequent challenges from other non-signatory groups declines, as these groups update their beliefs about that government and the efficacy of violent versus nonviolent mobilization (Joshi and Quinn 2016). Even as value-maximizing entities, insurgencies play various trust games in the post-conflict arena, constantly evaluating their adversary (the government). Thus, we study the post-rebel-victory politics of state as a system, in which the rebel incumbents' treatment of one group impacts the calculations of the other.

Repression is the government strategy to deter citizens from participating in collective action that threatens their monopoly of power, such as protest, dissent, or rebellion (Siegel 2011). Rebel-won control over the state is threatened domestically by active insurgencies or prospects of renewed rebellion, therefore impelling rebel incumbents to pursue coercive postwar governing strategies towards rivals to ensure state stability (Liu 2021). Availability of arms and weakness of state institutions make repression an easy strategy available to rebel victors for centralizing and consolidating state power (Mann 1984; 2004). Previous theories have pointed to the subduing effect of repression on civil war. Call (2012, p. 219) argues that "many authoritarian states offer some of the most durable instances of nonrecurrence" of civil war, because the use of "demonstrably violent repression" can eliminate armed opponents and remove the incentive to rebel. Nevertheless, authoritarian strategies are unappealing because they represent the regime's lack of ability to fulfill its aspirations (Call 2012). While repression is not a significant predictor of civil war recurrence, what is interesting in Call's (2012) empirical analysis is that two variables that are significant and positively correlated with civil war recurrence are the defining feature of almost all rebel victory cases. These are *new state* (0,1) and *instability* (0,1). Rebels come to power either within newly formed states (e.g., Eritrea and South Sudan) or in after major instability. Building on Call (2012), we thus think it is important to look within the universe of rebel victories to test the impact of repression on civil war recurrence.

Repression is an attractive strategy because cooption can be costly for rebel incumbents: distributing power to ideologically dissimilar groups increases risk of dissent within the ranks of the former rebel group (Martin 2022). An enhanced coercive capacity contributes to revolutionary regimes' durability (Levitsky and Way 2013). Accommodating the opposition through promises of social change makes revolutionary regimes prone to instability (Levitsky and Way 2021).

Overcoming counterrevolutionary threats in the regime's foundational period is necessary for the destruction of rival organizations and independent centers of societal power (Levitsky and Way 2022). We posit that rebel regimes are different from revolutionary regimes in that, unlike social revolutions, they do not come about after major uprising by the population and do not enjoy as much legitimacy as revolutionary regimes. As we argue below, rebel regimes can only consolidate power, gain legitimacy, and stop the recurrence of civil war through consensus-based cooption strategies of governance. Repression, as a governance strategy, increases the probability of small dissent groups turning into insurgencies, increasing the odds of civil war onset (Quinn et al. 2023).

Repression can continue during the rebel regime's incumbency, creating political and economic grievances that eventually lead to renewed conflict. In Zimbabwe, for instance, areas with ties to rival rebels were repressed militarily by the former rebel incumbents and received less developmental support for decades after rebel victory (Liu 2021). The two insurgent groups comprising dissident factions of Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) and Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) were suppressed militarily by the Zimbabwean National Army a year after the end of the 1964-1979 War of Liberation (Alexander 1998). Similarly, state consolidation following victory by the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) involved a non-democratic process of centralizing power, as former high-ranking rebel commanders were given ministerial positions and all elements of dissent among the population were quickly repressed (Reid 2005; Müller 2012). The EPLF engaged in multiple episodes of civil conflict with the Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement (EIJM) immediately after winning the civil war. Therefore, we hypothesize that:

> *H. 1. Rebel regimes that opt for repression are more likely to experience renewed armed conflict.*

Considering the costliness of repression both for rebel regime legitimacy and international standing, rebel victors may coopt insurgents. Rebels can accommodate rivals through (1) unilateral constitutional change, (2) elite powersharing arrangements, (3) peace agreements, or (4) negotiated constitutional reform. Of the four strategies, unilateral constitutional change is the least consensus-based form of cooption. Victorious rebels can repeal or amend existing constitutions when incompatible with their ideology or social, political, and economic objectives. Unilateral constitutional change creates new or amended constitutions that simply reflect the incumbent rebels' wartime agenda. This unilateral form of constitutional change excludes consultations with insurgents, civil society actors, or dissenting groups. Cooption happens through changes to the "law of the land" that the incumbents see fit, mostly based on promises made during the war of a new mode of governance in the country. The Taliban, for instance, drafted a fourteen-page constitution in 1998, following their first victory in Afghanistan (Kleiner 2000). Though never implemented, the Constitution granted citizens the right to fair trial, freedom of expression, the right to education (for both men and women), and other rights that later proved to be in contradiction with the Taliban's stringent methods of societal control. The constitution-drafting process did not involve input from any sectors of society and mainly included scholars of Islam's interpretation of state governance structures. Rebel incumbents often use unilateral constitutional change to consolidate their power, instead of building cohesive institutions that reduce political grievances and incentives for contesting incumbents' power through armed rebellion. This leads to our second hypothesis,

> *H. 2. Rebel regimes that coopt insurgencies through unilateral constitutional change are more likely to experience renewed civil conflict.*

The second cooption strategy is powersharing arrangements;[7] i.e., providing insurgents with a share of executive power. These arrangements or pacts have shown mixed results in post-conflict settings, irrespective of conflict termination type (Mehler 2009; Roessler 2016; Neudorfer, Theuerkauf, and Wolff 2020). On the one hand, powersharing helps incumbents extend their power over other ethnic or societal groups through coopting their leaders (Roessler 2016). Gaining access to state resources through powersharing, insurgent leaders manage to keep their followers safe from state violence, consolidating their position and deepening their influence (Roessler 2016; Sharif 2022). Powersharing, as a cooption strategy, can prevent civil war recurrence in the short term by maintaining a delicate balance of power among incumbents and their rivals. Powersharing is especially important for our analysis of post-Cold War conflicts, since outside actors have increasingly sought to resolve violent conflicts with powersharing arrangements, pressuring incumbents to include insurgents in key state positions (Mehler 2005)

On the other hand, political bargaining over state power could end in large scale political violence (Roessler 2016). Most insurgent groups in African conflicts tend to join powersharing pacts to maintain their position as potential peace spoilers (Mehler 2009). In most African cases, power-sharing pacts, encouraged by foreign donors, increases chances of conflict recurrence; the pacts are only a ploy for warlords to gain access to state resources, without the intention of reforming state institutions for capacity and inclusivity (Englebert and Tull 2008; Radil and Flint 2013). International actors often invite political-military entrepreneurs or ethnic rebel organizations to the negotiation table, which provides political pay-offs for insurgent violence and usually impedes solving conflict-related problems on the local level (Tull and Mehler 2005;

[7] We follow O'Leary (2013, 3) in defining powersharing as "any set of arrangements that prevents one agent, or organized collective agency, from being the winner who holds all critical power, whether temporarily or permanently."

Mehler 2009). In cases of rebel victory, these arrangements usually take place in the form of targeted cooptions. In Ethiopia, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) wrote the Transitional Charter of Ethiopia following its victory over the Derg regime in 1991, laying out powersharing arrangements for rebel groups that had won victory as a coalition. In the summer of 1992, political differences about the procedures for declaring Oromia a free nation precipitated the withdrawal of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) from the Transitional Government, rearming its combatants, and restarting conflict (Colletta, Kostner, and Wiederhofer 1996).

While powersharing agreements may serve peace in the short term, conflict recurs when the agreed-upon governing coalition fails to provide insurgent leaders with resources to maintain leadership positions or when insurgent populations perceive their leaders as traitors and either reorganize with a new leadership or defect to other active insurgencies. Previous studies have also shown that, despite powersharing's positive impact on peace, including ethnic groups in powersharing arrangements that degrades their previous access to power increases chances of civil war onset (Cederman et al. 2010). Powersharing agreements may, on the surface, signal concessionary behavior towards rebels but are located towards the right of our consensus-based spectrum of insurgency cooption (Figure 1). Within our theoretical framework, they will not reduce chances of civil war recurrence due to their unilateral nature. Rebuilding a state after it has almost failed and gaining territorial authority and legitimacy requires the adoption of governance strategies that are consensus-based. Powersharing agreements fare low on the consensus-based spectrum and will not prevent civil war recurrence in weak states. An ethnographic study of post-conflict arrangements by Lewis (2020) in Uganda (which is a weak state, but not a case of rebel victory) arrives at a similar conclusion. Thus, coopting rivals through powersharing pacts alone

might have an adverse effect on peace by increasing chances of civil war recurrence. Therefore, we hypothesize that,

> *H. 3. Rebel regimes that coopt insurgencies through powersharing arrangements are more likely to experience renewed civil conflict.*

Third, rebel incumbents can coopt insurgent groups by signing peace agreements. Peace agreements are crucial to post-conflict statesmanship of rebel incumbents because they broaden the size of the governing coalition, thereby increasing actors' incentives to maintain peace (Joshi and Mason 2011). While the process of negotiating a peace agreement might only include insurgency leaders, it is based more on consensus than elite powersharing pacts. International organizations, civil society actors, and other third parties are often present during the negotiation process, making peace agreements a more inclusive cooption strategy than elite pacts. By signing peace agreements and extending a degree of state power to domestic challengers, incumbent rebels invite insurgent leaders to share the newly won state power, using them as conduits between the state and their dissenting constituencies.

Despite their benefits, peace agreements can also detract from the security of the rebel regime. Peace agreements that do not call for fundamental changes in state institutions are similar to elite powersharing arrangements - they only mandate the revision of executive powersharing. While the process of arriving at a peace agreement is more transparent and consensus-based than backdoor pacts, signing peace agreements that only include provisions for a ceasefire and a change in the ruling coalition - which often is the case in the context of rebel victories - might not prevent conflict from recurring. Creating institutional accountability, constraining the power of the executive branch, and bringing about social and economic reform are deciding factors for peace (Hoddie and Hartzell 2005; Walter 2015), and their exclusion from peace accords might make

them ineffective as peacebuilding tools. In the process of arriving at peace agreements, civil society actors facilitate peace agreements that are more reflective of civil society group views and are more conducive to peace. Therefore, we hypothesize that,

H. 4. Rebel regimes that coopt insurgencies through peace agreements are less likely to experience renewed civil conflict.

The fourth cooption strategy is negotiated constitutional reform, where rebel incumbents provide concessions to rivals through extending political, social, and civic rights to insurgencies or populations that did not support them during the war. Constitutional reform is one of the most prominent provisions of an accord and tools of conflict management (Widner 2008; Nathan 2020). Nathan (2020) suggests that post-conflict constitutions following negotiated settlements should be understood not as mere parts of peace agreements, but as independent causes of peace. Nineteen of thirty-four (55.8%) comprehensive accords between 1989–2012 include a provision for constitutional reform, and constitutional reform has been initiated to some degree in all of them (Joshi, Quinn, and Regan 2015). Rebel incumbents can use other policy changes to coopt dissenters, such as executive reform, legislative reform, education reform, media reform, etc. Nevertheless, constitutional reform is the most path-dependent form of institutional reform (Nathan 2020). Constitutions can be used for nationbuilding in a new state or to promote peace and cooperation among communities to end internal conflicts; nevertheless, they are hard to change. Having studied all types of institutional reform after the formal end of conflict in the Peace Accords Matrix (PAM), we found that constitutional reform is the type least likely to undergo reversals (Joshi, Quinn, and Regan 2015).

Constitutional reform that is part of a negotiated peace agreement is the most salient form of consensus-based cooption. Compared to other political institutions, constitutions can play a

significant part in incentivizing existing or new challengers to pursue nonviolent channels to influence rebel incumbent behavior. Almost all rebel groups attempt to change the constitution upon gaining power over the state. Accepting their rivals' input in reforming the constitution is an important sign of the rebel regime's proclivity towards an inclusive governance. The presence of a written, negotiated text on the country's future governance structure creates a mechanism for both citizens and international actors to hold rebel incumbents accountable in case of a change in behavior away from the negotiated terms (Bell 2008; Walter 2015). Although post-conflict participatory and inclusive processes might pose a threat to the integrity of rebel incumbents and risk fractionalization, we expect that more consensus-based strategies for rival cooption will minimize chances of military challenges to the rebel regime. Therefore, we hypothesize that consensus-based cooption strategies reduce instances of armed conflict:

> *H. 5. Rebel regimes that coopt insurgencies through negotiated constitutional reform are less likely to experience renewed civil conflict.*

Other Plausible Explanations

Civil War Recurrence due to Third-Party Actors

Third-party actors can pressure or assist rebel incumbents, influencing rebel regimes' potential for territorial consolidation. Sanctions and arms embargoes are the primary tool for putting pressure on states to end civil conflicts (Cortright and Lopez 2000; Charron 2011; Eriksson and Wallensteen 2015; Hultman and Peksen 2017). With rebel victory, international actors may quickly resort to putting pressure on former non-state actors to prevent renewed conflict. Rebel victors in many cases, such as the Comoros (1999), Somalia (1991), Haiti (1991), Azerbaijan (1993), Rwanda (1994), Afghanistan (1996), Central African Republic (2003), and Afghanistan (2021), faced

sanctions or arms embargoes immediately after winning control of the state. International pressure to maintain peace might exacerbate perverse incentives for repression, tipping the scale away from cooption. In other instances, international pressure might encourage rebel incumbents to build inclusive polities through coopting rivals. We expect international pressure to have a significant effect on the decline in chances of renewed civil conflict.

Civil War Recurrence due to Economic and Political Grievances

It is conceivable that civil war recurs following rebel victory due to political or economic grievances. Low levels of human development, especially occurring within specific ethnic groups, create incentives to change the status quo (Murshed 2002; Fearon and Laitin 2003). Mismanagement of natural resources by rebel incumbents, oppressive governance strategies, and trade embargoes or sanctions by international actors can create conditions ill-suited for human development, such as poverty, lack of access to healthcare or education, or lack of opportunities for economic growth. Such conditions can incentivize citizens to form insurgencies or join existing groups to challenge rebel incumbents. Thus, economic grievances can be endogenous to the impact of rebel victors' governance strategies on civil war recurrence. Repeat civil wars can also occur due to political grievances arising in non-democratic regimes with large, ethnically diverse populations (Gates 2002; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Sharif 2021). Fearon and Laitin (2003) had argued that the rise of insurgencies is determined by economic, not political, explanations, with lack of democracy losing significance in explaining civil war prevalence in the presence of factors related to economic development and economic growth. In the next section, we test our hypotheses and the effect of other plausible explanations using a dataset of global instances of rebel victory (1989-2015).

Research Design: Data and Methodology

The Data

To analyze determinants of civil war recurrence following rebel victories, we developed a dataset capturing time-varying variables in rebel government tenure (1989-2015). We define rebel victory as any civil war culminating in extra-legal seizure of central authority, either by non-state armed forces or factions of the state armed forces. We picked all cases of rebel victory since the end of the Cold war from the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset, where the rebel side managed to "oust the government, or comprehensively defeat or eliminate the opposition, who may succumb to the power of the other through capitulation or public announcement" (Kreutz 2010).[8] Following Kreutz (2010, 2021), our sample of rebel victory includes (a) non-state armed groups that ousted an incumbent regime and took control of the state central authority, and (b) coup d'états that followed civil conflict. We excluded coups d'état in which military officers took control of the central government independently of a violent campaign that produced twenty-five battle-related deaths. Since our focus is on rebel incumbent governance, we also excluded cases, such as Haiti in 2004, in which rebels made major territorial advances but did not capture the capital (Landau-Wells 2018) or when rebel leaders came to power through national elections (Liberia 1997).

Armed conflict data is amenable to disaggregated analysis at the dyad level as well as aggregate analysis at the level of conflict or country, i.e., the system level. We concur with Lewis' (2016) critique of using dyadic conflict data, which has led to doubtful conclusions on the conflict-prevention impact of powersharing. Lewis (2016) argues that undercounting of rebel groups and the bias towards ethnic narratives leads to biased conclusions in favor of powersharing. This is

[8] Since 2015, there have been no cases of rebel victory, except for the Taliban victory in Afghanistan in 2021, which we do not include.

especially a problem in weak states where barriers to entry for new rebel groups are low, and thus rebel groups are often quite small and weak when they emerge (Lewis 2020). Our study is entirely composed of weak states, which is a facilitating condition for rebel victory. Because we focus on territorial control (consolidation of rebel victory) after civil war, we opt for a system-level analysis, rather than a dyadic one. Our data include 361 rebel incumbency-years following 23 rebel victory cases since the Cold War. For instance, Afghanistan enters the dataset in 1992 with the Mujahideen victory and exits the set in 1996 with the Taliban takeover, with variables capturing yearly changes in rebel governance strategies for five years (1992-1996). The analysis focuses only on the post-Cold War years for two reasons. First, rebel victories after the Cold War are relatively fewer compared to cases of armed conflict termination with peace agreements (Kreutz 2010). Second, rebel victories during this period occurred despite the international community's relentless efforts to resolve armed conflict through peace processes (Boutros-Ghali 1992).

Outcome Variable

The empirical implication of our argument is that rebel incumbents' state-consolidating strategies impact conflictual activity with insurgent groups following the end of a civil conflict in rebel victory. Our outcome of interest is renewed civil war, which is coded "1" for the presence of any active dyad within a given country-year following rebel victory in the UCDP/Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) Dyadic Armed Conflict Dataset and UCDP One-Sided Violence Dataset (Pettersson 2021). For each year of rebel incumbency, we only included conflicts with domestic insurgent groups surpassing 25 battle-related deaths and excluded instances of interstate conflict or violence in the first year of rebel incumbency related to conflict with the former government. Of the 361 incumbency-years in our data, 115 experienced active armed conflict with one or more

insurgent groups. The Central African Republic (2014-2015), Democratic Republic of the Congo (2013), and Afghanistan (1995) each saw 4 active groups in the years mentioned, the highest number of insurgent groups in conflict with the rebel government. Rebel incumbency-years without any active dyad are coded "0". Appendix Table A.1 lists all cases of renewed civil conflict after rebel victory and insurgents fighting rebel incumbents, including years of active conflict. Appendix Table A.2 provides descriptive statistics of the data and Table A.7 presents all cases of civil war recurrence during rebel incumbency.

Predictor Variables

We argue that rebel regimes can use repression to deter civilians from joining opposition movements in order to deter potential challengers to rebel state control (Hypothesis 1). We capture the repression strategy with the presence of political terror, defined as "violations of basic human rights to the physical integrity of the person by agents of the state within the territorial boundaries of the state in question" (Gibney et al. 2021). The Political Terror Scale (PTS) dataset measures political terror with an ordinal variable on a five-level scale, with "1" indicating that a country is under secure rule of law and imprisonment, or torture is rare, and "5" indicating that terror has expanded to the whole population. Thus, higher scores on the variable correspond to more repressive policies against civilians, which we expect to positively correlate with the probability of civil war recurrence.

Unilateral constitutional change is the first cooption strategy in the rebel incumbent's arsenal to address grievances of insurgent groups or civilian opposition (Hypothesis 2). We employ a numeric variable, the cumulative sum of constitutional changes, to capture the number of major constitutional reforms during rebel incumbency. The variable comes from the Cross National Time

Series Data Archive and captures the number of basic alterations in state constitutions, with the extreme case being the adoption of a new constitution that significantly alters government branches affecting the political system (Banks and Wilson 2020). Elite powersharing pacts is the rebel incumbent's second cooption strategy (Hypothesis 3). To operationalize this strategy, we leverage data on 186 power-sharing negotiations from 1945–2011 (Nomikos 2021). We consider two types of such agreements: institutional and proportional. Institutional powersharing is a regime in which each of the parties to civil war have veto power over state policy, while proportional powersharing describes regimes with quotas for ethnic groups in the legislature or for ministry positions in a shared government (Nomikos 2021). In our data, no rebel regime signed either kind of powersharing agreement in the first year of its incumbency. Moreover, there are few cases of institutional powersharing: rebel victors do not make great compromises on executive power. Since powersharing pacts can be entered without a formal agreement, we alternatively proxy for powersharing using the change in size of ethnic groups represented by junior partners sharing executive power in the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset (Vogt et al. 2015).[9]

Cooption through signing peace agreements is the third strategy, signaling the new rulers' intention for peace and building more inclusive polities (Hypothesis 4). We identified peace agreements signed during the incumbency-years following civil conflict in our dataset (1989-2015) by consulting the UN Peacemaker Database (2019). We included all intrastate peace agreements and excluded agreements signed by rebel incumbents either with other states or regional organizations. The fourth cooption strategy is negotiated constitutional reform, which we captured with the cumulative sum of constitutional provisions in peace agreements (Hypothesis 5). The

[9] See, Appendix Table A.5.

variable is a running annual count of constitutional provisions in peace agreements in the UN Peacemaker Database. We used the Language of Peace database to identify provisions for constitutional reform (Language of Peace 2021). Constitutional reform in a peace agreement is identified if the agreement contains issues specific to reforming the current constitution, the constitution making process, the constitutional principle, or general constitutional matter.

Variables for Alternative Explanations and Controls

To account for alternative explanations specific to international pressure, we included two binary variables, indicating whether the rebel regime was targeted by international sanctions or arms embargoes. The sanctions variable notes whether the rebel regime in a given year was under economic sanction, including export and import restrictions, by the UN, the US, or the European Union. The data for sanctions was gathered by comparing the Global Sanctions Database (Felbermayr et al. 2020), covering all multilateral and bilateral sanctions from 1950 to 2019, and the German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA) Sanctions Dataset, covering the UN, the EU, and the US sanctions between 1990 and 2010 (Portela and von Soest 2012). The arms embargo binary variable notes whether the rebel regime was under an arms embargo by the UN, the US, or the European Union and was taken from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Arms Embargo Archive, covering all multilateral embargoes (1950-2022).

To test for the impact of political grievances on civil war recurrence, we controlled for the rebel regime's place on the democratic-authoritarian spectrum. We created a binary variable based on the Polity II score for each rebel regime-year (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2018). Regimes with a score of 6 and above were coded as democracies and those with a score below 6 as non-democracies in the Polity IV spectrum ranging from -10 (highly autocratic) to 10 (highly

democratic).[10] Economic grievances are often measured with a country's gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. Walter (2015) shows that GDP is not a significant predictor of repeat civil wars, explaining that it might be because countries that experience civil conflict recurrence are all poor. Considering the political and economic uncertainties of rebel victory, the difficulty of estimating GDP in the immediate aftermath of war, and the lack of correspondence between GDP per capita and economic grievances in highly unequal societies, we chose instead to use a country's score for human development to test the effect of economic grievances on repeat civil war. We obtain the score from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 2020) Human Development Index (HDI). HDI is a composite score of life expectancy, education levels, and gross national income (GNI) per capita. The score ranges between 0 and 1, with higher scores indicating better conditions for human development.

Third-party actors may lend support to insurgents to organize rebellion and challenge rebel incumbent rule (Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce 2008; Day 2011). Even when the state offers rebel groups an attractive political settlement, they may believe they stand a better chance at fighting their way into a better position, leading to ongoing conflict (Day 2011). We control for third-party (state or non-state) support to groups challenging rebel incumbents with a binary variable, noting any military, financial, territorial, or intelligence support to insurgents. The data come from the UCDP External Support Dataset (Meier et al. 2022).

Factors related to rebel organization or the course of rebellion may influence post-victory strategies and potentially war recurrence. Woldemariam (2018) argues that rebel organizations are

[10] We use a binary measure for democracy, instead of using the continuous Polity scores, because higher levels on the Polity score, indicating institutional democracy, are very rare following rebel victory. We also do not have any theoretical reason to control for the effect of an interval measure of democracy on rebel regimes. Our variable of interest to capture repression is *political terror*.

most susceptible to fragmentation at two critical moments: when they have incurred significant military losses and when they have achieved significant military gains. Martin (2022) argues that rebels that come to power through highly intensive wars are less likely to face defection. Martin (2022) tested whether third-party support, ideology, ethnicity, organization's political parent, or war intensity impacted the probability of defection from rebel rulers. The study only found support for war intensity, which we control with a conflict intensity variable. We coded rebel victories as high in war intensity if they are coded in UCDP as having intensity level 2 and low if intensity level was 1. None of our cases were associated with intensity level 3.

We also control the rebel regime's tenure. Perkoski (2022) presents a theory of armed group fragmentation during the war, which occurs in three stages. In the first stage, internal unity prevails, and organizations operate most efficiently. In stage two, factions form as members coalesce around their shared dissatisfaction with the status quo, while in stage three, factions break away to create new armed groups that rectify their grievances and fulfill their organizational visions. Since group fragmentation is time-dependent, following Perkoski (2022), we assume that rebel victors are the most cohesive in their first year of tenure, with the probability of defection increasing with time. In our models, to capture the rebel regime's changes through time, we controlled for regime tenure: the number of years rebels had been in power in each incumbency-year. Previous studies suggest that chances of civil war occurrence grow with population size (Hegre et al. 2013; Goldstone 2022). We controlled for state population with the natural log of population in each incumbency-year (World Bank 2018). Alternatively, in the models reported in the Appendix, we control for population density, since insurgencies often emerge in peripheral, less densely populated areas, and geographically larger states may have difficulty policing the periphery.

Model Specifications and Results

Our data is in time-series cross-sectional format and our outcome variable is binary, indicating renewed civil conflict. The unit of analysis is rebel incumbency-year. We estimate six logistic random effects models with panel-robust standard errors. All independent variables are lagged by a year, accounting for panel-induced serial correlation between observations. Table 2 presents the results of our analysis. We include repression and four cooption strategies (unilateral constitutional change, powersharing, peace agreement, and negotiated constitutional reform) in different configurations in models 1-5, controlling for the effect of one on the other in each model. Model 6 includes all the explanatory variables. All models include variables for alternative explanations and control variables.

Table 1. Determinant of civil war recurrence following rebel victory

Across all models presented in Table 2, the coefficient for political terror is positive and statistically significant ($p<0.001$). This suggests that the repression strategy by rebel incumbents increases the risk of civil war. Based on Model 6, the odds ratio of civil war recurrence over the odds of peace is 2.40. This lends strong support to hypothesis 1, rebel victors that opt for repression are more likely to engage in renewed civil conflict. Among the four cooption strategies, only the coefficient for negotiated constitutional reform (Hypothesis 5) is consistently negative and significant ($p<0.001$). Based on Model 6, the odds ratio is 0.28. Figure 2 (based on Model 6) presents predictions of cumulative constitutional reforms in peace agreement and the repressive strategy. In all our models, other cooption strategies, such as unilateral constitutional change (Hypothesis 2), powersharing (Hypothesis 3), and peace agreements (Hypothesis 4) are not significantly associated with civil war recurrence. Thus, among the four cooption strategies, only

the most consensus-based strategy - negotiated constitutional reform - is significantly associated with lesser chances of repeat civil war. This finding confirms our theoretical expectation, specifying the importance of incorporating input from political opposition in institutional reforms in post-war states.

Figure 2. Civil war recurrence prediction

We did not find support for the alternative explanations, linking international pressure with peace after rebel victory, specifically with sanctions and arms embargoes. Nevertheless, we found support for the effect on civil war recurrence of third-party support for insurgents, which is consistent with Day's (2011) findings in the multi-insurgency case of Uganda. As we discussed above, external support to rebel incumbents does not solve the regime's legitimacy issues and does not help with territorial consolidation. The coefficient for war intensity is also not significant in any of our models, suggesting that wartime dynamics fade in the face of post-conflict governance decisions: once rebels come to power, it may not matter how they fought the war but what governance decisions they take during their tenure. Finally, the results hold when we introduce a control variable for coups. The coefficient for coup d'état is not significant in any of the models, suggesting that the universe of cases we consider are indeed not that different (Appendix Table A4). In both cases, there is ousting of an incumbent regime by a non-state armed group following civil conflict. Both rebels and coup-makers face major legitimacy challenges. As our theory suggests, these power turnovers will not lead to state consolidation unless they are followed by consensus-based cooption processes, such as negotiated constitutional reform.

One of the limitations of our findings is what Day (2019, p. 19) calls "overaggregation," which misses key distinctions among individual rebellions, oversimplifying how conflicts end.

Our theoretical focus in the paper is on rebel incumbent strategies in the face of rebellion, while our empirical analysis controls for some of the variables responsible for insurgent capacity and motivation, such as third-party support and political grievances (Day 2011). To further test the systemic nature of civil war recurrence, we added an alternative specification for the dependent variable: active conflict dyad counts in a rebel incumbency-year, using annualized data on number of active armed conflict dyads in the UCDP data (Pettersson 2021). Appendix Table A.3 presents generalized linear model (GLM) results, which are similar to those presented in Table 2. To summarize, our analysis shows that, controlling for all external factors (international pressure on rebel incumbents and support for insurgents) repression increases chances of civil war recurrence following rebel victory, while cooption strategies have different impacts on conflict recurrence, based on the extent to which they are based on consensus among incumbents and dissenting groups. Only consensus-building strategies of coopting dissenters can reduce the probability of civil war recurrence and help rebel incumbents consolidate power. Future research should devise other proxies to capture our theoretical concepts of unilateral and consensus-based cooption and test our results in the light of variation in governance strategies.

Conclusion: How to Maintain Peace After Rebel Victory

In this paper, we look within the universe of rebel victories since the end of the Cold War, bracketing the impact of conflict termination type on civil war recurrence. While rebel victors are not significantly different from government victories in sustaining peace (Caplan and Hoeffler 2017), our analysis shows that inclusive state consolidation strategies by rebel incumbents, such as negotiated constitutional reform, have a significantly negative effect on chances of civil war recurrence. Rebel regimes that opt to repress rivals face more conflict with existing or emerging

insurgencies aiming to either change the status quo or resist modes of control by rebel incumbents. Victory by the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL) in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), for instance, was followed by nineteen years of terror or violations of civil and political rights among a large part of the population (1997-2015), the highest measure of oppression in our data. Laurent Kabila had made it clear during the war that he intended to run the DRC with a transitional government composed exclusively of AFDL members (Reyntjens 2009; Young 2020). Indeed, after rebel victory, civilians perceived rebel incumbents as a "regime of occupation" (Reyntjens 2009, 147). In our data, the DRC (1997-2015) experienced only six years without armed conflict passing the twenty-five battle-related death threshold.

Our theory and empirical findings have several implications for international organizations and state actors formulating policy targeted towards rebel victors. The unanticipatedly swift seizure of central authority by the Taliban in 2021 compelled international organizations and state actors to scramble for foreign policy strategies towards the Taliban. The immediate international policy towards Afghanistan was devising crippling economic sanctions and the freezing of state funds abroad through UN Resolution 2611 (UN Security Council 2021). Within this context, it might be tempting to pressure the Taliban to build a government of national unity, including ethnic leaders in an executive powersharing arrangement (similar to the case of post-2003 Iraq), hoping that such a constellation would lead to more accountability by incumbents towards a larger portion of the Afghan population. It might also be tempting to keep the sanctions regime on Afghanistan, promoting dissent among the population, and aiming for a new regime with a better human rights record. While these methods might work in other contexts, our research on rebel victory cases shows that promoting dissent among the population increases repressive responses, which increase chances of civil war. In extreme cases, third-party actors may promote regime change in

Afghanistan. The literature on foreign-imposed regime change has shown dismal returns for such soft or hard interventions (Burma 2016; Downes 2021). Downes (2021) shows that foreign-imposed leadership change in particular increases the risk of civil war onset three and a half times, while institutional regime changes increase chances of civil war recurrence in poor and/or multiethnic countries. We have argued in this work that the only factor associated with lesser chances of civil war recurrence is cooption of rivals through consensus-based peace processes, including negotiated constitutional reform, which the external actors can facilitate thorough mediation and peace process support.

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Manuscript Table

Table 1. Determinant of civil war recurrence following rebel victory

	DV: active conflict dyads					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Constitutional provision	-0.460*					-1.211*
	(0.228)					(0.583)
Peace agreement		0.046				0.058
		(0.061)				(0.052)
Constitutional change			0.083			0.236
			(0.367)			(0.414)
Powersharing				0.114		0.393
				(0.523)		(0.651)
Political terror					0.809***	0.877***
					(0.193)	(0.229)
Sanctions (0,1)	0.508	0.260	0.283	0.248	-0.009	0.384
	(0.455)	(0.409)	(0.391)	(0.464)	(0.319)	(0.350)
Arms embargo (0,1)	-0.241	0.004	-0.078	-0.038	-0.540	-0.882
	(0.779)	(0.645)	(0.647)	(0.659)	(0.760)	(1.034)
Population (log)	0.967**	0.792**	0.840**	0.808*	0.690	0.856*
	(0.311)	(0.307)	(0.321)	(0.337)	(0.383)	(0.432)
Democracy (0,1)	-1.787	-1.736	-1.729	-1.601	-1.575	-2.143*
	(1.290)	(1.078)	(1.119)	(1.240)	(1.271)	(0.994)
Human development	-3.601	-3.424	-3.485	-3.483	-1.638	-1.138
	(2.363)	(2.043)	(2.206)	(2.107)	(2.320)	(2.629)
Regime tenure	-0.048	-0.065	-0.063	-0.061	-0.047	-0.053
	(0.041)	(0.038)	(0.047)	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.055)
External support (0,1)	1.499***	1.570***	1.525***	1.543***	1.282***	1.303***
	(0.322)	(0.336)	(0.325)	(0.331)	(0.370)	(0.371)
Conflict intensity (0,1)	0.587	0.596	0.651	0.655	0.477	0.969
	(1.327)	(1.099)	(1.311)	(1.223)	(1.273)	(1.563)
Constant	-	-	-	-	-	-
	14.363**	11.876*	12.609*	12.068*	13.596*	17.141*
	(4.765)	(4.711)	(5.054)	(5.107)	(6.015)	(7.179)
Observations	338	338	338	338	338	338
Panels	23	23	23	23	23	23
Wald chi2	127.60	83.79	69.33	66.54	86.79	220.92
Prob > chi2	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Notes. All independent variables are lagged by a year. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Two tailed tests. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Online Appendix

Territorial Consolidation After Rebel Victory: When does Civil War Recur?

Table A.1. Descriptive Statistics

Variable	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Conflict (0,1)	361	0.32	0.47	0.00	1.00
Constitutional provisions	338	0.25	0.72	0.00	5.00
Peace agreements	338	2.59	5.32	0.00	24.00
Constitutional changes	338	1.62	1.26	0.00	5.00
Powersharing	338	0.30	0.84	0.00	4.00
Political terror	338	3.07	1.20	1.00	5.00
Sanctions (0,1)	338	0.19	0.39	0.00	1.00
Arms embargo (0,1)	338	0.24	0.43	0.00	1.00
Population density	338	91.30	104.54	3.55	449.28
Population (log)	338	15.64	1.30	12.90	18.40
Democracy (0,1)	338	0.27	0.44	0.00	1.00
Human development	338	0.53	0.19	0.10	0.81
Regime tenure	338	10.24	6.64	1.00	26.00
External support (0,1)	338	0.27	0.44	0.00	1.00
Conflict intensity (0,1)	338	0.49	0.50	0.00	1.00
Coup d'état	338	0.23	0.42	0.00	1.00

Table A.2. Correlations matrix

	Armed conflict (0,1)	Active conflict dyads	Constitutional provisions	Peace agreements	Constitutional changes	Powersharing	Political terror	Sanctions (0,1)	Arms embargo (0,1)	Population density	Population (log)	Democracy (0,1)	Human development	Regime tenure	External support	Conflict intensity (0,1)	Coup d'état
Armed conflict (0,1)	1.00																
Active conflict dyads	0.86	1.00															
Constitutional provisions	0.19	0.24	1.00														
Peace agreements	0.05	0.08	0.34	1.00													
Constitutional changes	-0.23	-0.21	0.28	0.44	1.00												
Powersharing	0.14	0.21	0.75	0.50	0.30	1.00											
Political terror	0.58	0.55	0.31	0.10	-0.16	0.26	1.00										
Sanctions (0,1)	0.22	0.16	0.25	-0.05	-0.16	0.18	0.36	1.00									
Arms embargo (0,1)	0.23	0.12	-0.09	-0.17	-0.22	-0.15	0.33	0.40	1.00								
Population density	-0.11	-0.17	-0.01	-0.13	-0.05	-0.07	-0.33	0.01	0.03	1.00							
Population (log)	0.53	0.54	0.30	0.10	-0.16	0.24	0.53	0.12	0.15	-0.27	1.00						
Democracy (0,1)	-0.39	-0.34	-0.11	0.08	0.47	-0.04	-0.46	-0.28	-0.34	-0.01	-0.20	1.00					

Human development	-0.43	-0.41	-0.19	0.07	0.17	-0.15	-0.56	-0.16	-0.17	-0.01	-0.16	0.41	1.00				
Regime tenure	-0.19	-0.14	0.00	0.15	0.22	0.04	-0.28	-0.17	-0.11	0.09	0.12	0.33	0.41	1.00			
External support	0.34	0.29	0.36	0.21	0.17	-0.04	0.29	-0.05	-0.08	-0.10	0.27	-0.14	-0.11	-0.08	1.00		
Conflict intensity (0,1)	0.42	0.40	0.21	-0.08	-0.41	0.07	0.55	0.18	0.22	-0.06	0.37	-0.60	-0.46	-0.05	0.23	1.00	
Coup d'état	-0.14	-0.19	-0.03	-0.17	0.33	-0.02	-0.31	0.05	0.08	0.26	-0.33	0.10	0.10	-0.13	-0.12	-0.54	1.00

Table A.3 presents generalized linear model (GLM) results of alternative specification of civil war recurrence during rebel incumbency: yearly count of active armed conflict dyads. The dependent variable includes all active dyads in the UCDP conflict data in a given year (Pettersson 2021). Results from this alternative dependent variable are similar to the ones presented in the manuscript.

Table A.3. Estimations of active armed dyads during rebel incumbency

DV: count of active conflict dyads						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Constitutional provision	-0.460*					-1.211*
	(0.228)					(0.583)
Peace agreement		0.046				0.058
		(0.061)				(0.052)
Constitutional change			0.083			0.236
			(0.367)			(0.414)
Powersharing				0.114		0.393
				(0.523)		(0.651)
Political terror					0.809***	0.877***
					(0.193)	(0.229)
Sanctions (0,1)	0.508	0.260	0.283	0.248	-0.009	0.384
	(0.455)	(0.409)	(0.391)	(0.464)	(0.319)	(0.350)
Arms embargo (0,1)	-0.241	0.004	-0.078	-0.038	-0.540	-0.882
	(0.779)	(0.645)	(0.647)	(0.659)	(0.760)	(1.034)
Population (log)	0.967**	0.792**	0.840**	0.808*	0.690	0.856*
	(0.311)	(0.307)	(0.321)	(0.337)	(0.383)	(0.432)
Democracy (0, 1)	-1.787	-1.736	-1.729	-1.601	-1.575	-2.143*
	(1.290)	(1.078)	(1.119)	(1.240)	(1.271)	(0.994)
Human development	-3.601	-3.424	-3.485	-3.483	-1.638	-1.138
	(2.363)	(2.043)	(2.206)	(2.107)	(2.320)	(2.629)
Regime tenure	-0.048	-0.065	-0.063	-0.061	-0.047	-0.053
	(0.041)	(0.038)	(0.047)	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.055)
External support	1.499***	1.570***	1.525***	1.543***	1.282***	1.303***
	(0.322)	(0.336)	(0.325)	(0.331)	(0.370)	(0.371)
Conflict intensity (0,1)	0.587	0.596	0.651	0.655	0.477	0.969
	(1.327)	(1.099)	(1.311)	(1.223)	(1.273)	(1.563)
Constant	-	-	-	-	-	-
	14.363**	11.876*	12.609*	12.068*	13.596*	17.141*
	(4.765)	(4.711)	(5.054)	(5.107)	(6.015)	(7.179)
Observations	338	338	338	338	338	338
Panels	23	23	23	23	23	23
Wald chi2	127.60	83.79	69.33	66.54	86.79	220.92
Prob > chi2	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Note. All explanatory variables are lagged by a year. The dependent variable is the annual number of active conflict dyads in the post-rebel victory period. Models are estimated using the generalized linear model (GLM) technique, assuming each panel to have errors that follow a different AR(1) process. Standard errors are in parenthesis. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ on two-tailed tests

Table A.4 replicates models presented in Table 1 in the main document, controlling for violent coups and including *population density* instead of *population (log)*, as insurgency is more likely to emerge in less densely populated areas or peripheries with less state presence. The estimated coefficient for population density is negative in all models and significant only in Models 1 and 3. This lends some support to consideration of population intensity, but the finding does not hold in Model 6.

Table A.4. Estimations of civil war recurrence during rebel incumbency

DV: active conflict dyads						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Constitutional provision	-0.524					-1.234*
	(0.299)					(0.551)
Peace agreement		0.043				0.060
		(0.077)				(0.062)
Constitutional change			0.071			0.124
			(0.429)			(0.499)
Powersharing				0.230		0.573
				(0.452)		(0.604)
Political terror					0.852***	0.910***
					(0.209)	(0.238)
Sanctions (0,1)	0.459	0.203	0.218	0.156	-0.052	0.294
	(0.475)	(0.451)	(0.422)	(0.453)	(0.311)	(0.313)
Arms Embargo (0,1)	-1.093	-0.440	-0.586	-0.374	-0.847	-1.272
	(0.943)	(0.861)	(0.766)	(0.897)	(0.857)	(1.062)
Population density	-0.010*	-0.007*	-0.008*	-0.007*	-0.004	-0.005
	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Coup d'état (0,1)	0.962	0.945	0.779	0.765	0.955	1.225
	(1.815)	(1.562)	(1.663)	(1.521)	(1.479)	(1.813)
Democracy (0,1)	-1.590	-1.677	-1.621	-1.506	-1.480	-1.986*
	(1.100)	(1.028)	(1.047)	(1.104)	(1.192)	(0.934)
Human development	-4.284	-3.782	-3.878	-3.642	-1.484	-0.927
	(3.052)	(2.553)	(2.712)	(2.613)	(2.847)	(3.217)
Regime tenure	0.001	-0.030	-0.026	-0.031	-0.025	-0.026
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.056)	(0.040)	(0.044)	(0.055)
External support (0,1)	1.516***	1.706***	1.632***	1.708***	1.414**	1.451**
	(0.383)	(0.447)	(0.384)	(0.408)	(0.436)	(0.448)
Conflict intensity (0,1)	2.921	2.315	2.408	2.263	1.939	2.784
	(2.008)	(1.644)	(1.800)	(1.740)	(1.777)	(2.010)
Constant	0.281	-0.064	0.076	-0.036	-3.802	-4.868
	(2.315)	(2.013)	(2.137)	(2.011)	(2.345)	(2.786)
Observations	338	338	338	338	338	338
Panels	23	23	23	23	23	23
Wald chi2	82.62	83.75	83.15	73.28	127.18	131.90
Prob > chi2	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Note. All explanatory variables are lagged by a year. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ on two tailed tests.

Table A.5 replicates model 4 and 6 in the main document, changing the powersharing variable with the size of junior partner from the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset (Vogt et al. 2015). We employ the change in size of ethnic groups represented by junior partners sharing executive power. The results are similar to specifying powersharing as number of powersharing agreements signed by the rebel regime.

Table A.5. Estimations of civil war recurrence during rebel incumbency

DV: active conflict dyads		
	(1)	(2)
Constitutional provision		-0.874**
		(0.306)
Peace agreement		0.099
		(0.064)
Constitutional change		0.171
		(0.499)
Size of junior partner	1.378	1.429
	(1.590)	(1.665)
Political terror		0.977***
		(0.237)
Sanctions (0,1)	0.234	0.259
	(0.447)	(0.283)
Arms Embargo (0,1)	-0.556	-1.332
	(0.818)	(1.170)
Population density	-0.008*	-0.004
	(0.004)	(0.004)
Coup d'état (0,1)	0.609	1.211
	(1.760)	(1.968)
Democracy (0,1)	-1.468	-2.139*
	(1.124)	(0.918)
Human development	-3.512	-0.567
	(2.783)	(3.189)
Regime tenure	-0.024	-0.032
	(0.040)	(0.054)
External support	1.599***	1.342**
	(0.391)	(0.484)
Conflict intensity (0,1)	2.372	2.753
	(1.804)	(1.943)
Constant	-0.190	-5.501*
	(2.121)	(2.761)
Observations	338	338
Panels	23	23
Wald chi2	91.27	167.04
Prob > chi2	0.000	0.000

Note. All explanatory variables are lagged by a year. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ on two tailed tests.

Table A.6 replicates model 5 and 6 in the manuscript's Table 1. The interaction term is not significant, and the results on the variables of interest are robust to this alternative model specification.

Table A.6. Determinants of civil war recurrence during rebel incumbency

DV: active conflict dyads		
	(1)	(2)
Constitutional provision		-1.282*
		(0.604)
Peace agreement		0.055
		(0.054)
Constitutional change		0.241
		(0.437)
Powersharing		0.394
		(0.658)
Political terror	0.745***	0.801***
	(0.193)	(0.218)
Sanctions (0,1)	-0.139	0.225
	(0.382)	(0.424)
Arms embargo (0,1)	-0.612	-1.112
	(0.777)	(1.074)
Population (log)	0.685	0.871
	(0.402)	(0.458)
Democracy (0,1)	-1.433	-1.939
	(1.309)	(1.045)
Human development	-1.314	-0.653
	(2.526)	(2.958)
Regime tenure	-0.108	-0.141
	(0.065)	(0.090)
External supporters	1.256***	1.234***
	(0.365)	(0.355)
Conflict intensity (0,1)	0.595	1.173
	(1.332)	(1.651)
Regime tenure : political terror	0.017	0.024
	(0.020)	(0.024)
Constant	-13.461*	-17.334*
	(6.287)	(7.589)
Observations	338	338
Panels	23	23
Wald chi2	111.10	244.49
Prob > chi2	0.000	0.000

All explanatory variables are lagged by a year. Standard errors are in parenthesis. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ on two-tailed tests

Table A.7. Cases of civil war recurrence following rebel victory

Cases of civil war recurrence	Insurgent groups in conflict with rebel incumbents
Eritrea: The Eritrean People's Liberation Front, EPLF (1991-2015)	Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement, EIJM (1997-2003)
Afghanistan: The Mujahideen (1992-96)	Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan (1992-96), Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan (1992-95), Hizb-i Wahdat (1992-95); Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami (1993-95); Taliban (1995-96)
South Sudan: Sudan People's Liberation Army, SPLA (2011-2015)	South Sudan Democratic Movement, SSDM/A (2011-2012); South Sudan Liberation Movement, SSLM/A (2011-2012); Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition, SPLM/A – IO (2013-15); SSDM/A - Cobra faction (2014)
Rwanda: Rwandan Patriotic Front, RPF (1994-2015)	Army for the Liberation of Rwanda (ALiR (1996-2000); Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, FDLR (2001-2012)
Comoros: Military rule by the former presidential guard (1989-1998)	Separatists on the islands (1997)
Somalia: United Somali Congress, USC (1991-2000)	Somali National Alliance, USC/SNA (1991-1996)
Ethiopia: Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front, EPRDF (1991-2015)	Issa and Gurgura Liberation Front, IGLF (1991); Oromo Liberation Front, OLF (1991-2015); Al Ittihad Al Islamiya, AIAI (1993-99); Ogaden National Liberation Front, ONLF (1994-2015)
Georgia: National Guard and Mkhedrioni (1992-2015)	Republic of South Ossetia (1992-2008); Republic of Abkhazia (1993); Zviadists (1992-93)
Afghanistan: Taliban (1996-2001)	Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan (1996); UIFSA (1997-2001)
Azerbaijan: military rule under forces of Suret Husseinov (1993-2015)	Republic of Artsakh (1993-2015); Special Forces Police Unit, OPON (1995)
Republic of Congo: Cobra militia (1997-2015)	Cocoye (1997-99), Ninjas (1998); Ntsiloulou (1998-2002)

Central African Republic: Forces of François Bozizé (2003-2015)	Seleka (2006-2013); CPJP (2009-11); anti-Balaka (2013-15); Popular Front for the Rebirth of the Central African Republic, FPRC (2014-15); Popular Front for Reconstruction - Baba Lade faction, FPR-BL (2014); Union for Peace in the Central African Republic, UPC (2014-15); Democratic Front for the People of Central Africa, FDPC (2015)
Libya: National Transitional Council (2011-2015)	Ansar al-Sharia in Libya, ASL (2013); Zintan Military Council (2014-15); Forces of the House of Representatives (2014-15); Islamic State (2015)
Afghanistan: United Islamic Front for Salvation of Afghanistan, UIFSA (2002-2015)	Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan (2002-13); Taliban (2003-15); Islamic State (2015)
Democratic Republic of Congo: Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo, AFDL (1997-2015)	Movement for the Liberation of the Congo, MLC (1998-2000); Congolese Rally for Democracy, RCD) (1998-2001); Baraka group (2005); National Congress for the Defence of the People, CNDP (2006-07); Bundu dia Kongo, BDK (2007-09); National Coalition of the People for the Sovereignty of Congo, CNPSC (2011-14); March 23 Movement, M23 (2012-13); Union of Congolese Patriots, UPCP (2012); Alliance of Patriots for a Free and Sovereign Congo, APCLS (2013-14); Kata Katanga (2013-14)