Online Appendix
When Reintegration of Ex-Combatants Turns Deadly: The State's Role in Preventing Post-Conflict Homicides

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1. Municipal-Level Study

1.1. Descriptive Statistics

Table 1 outlines variable definition and data sources for the municipal-level study, and Table 10 presents summary statistics. Figure 1 maps the presence of ex-combatants across municipalities. The correlation matrix in Table 11 presents relationships between key municipal-level variables. Of note is the positive association between coca cultivation and ex-combatant assassinations.

Table 1: Variable Descriptions and Data Sources

Variables	**Variable Description**	**Source**
Ex-combatant assassinations	Cumulative count of ex-combatants assassinated in the post-conflict period (2016–2020).	Instituto de Estudios para el Desarrollo y la Paz (INDEPAZ); Comunes (FARC party)
Protection by the state	Binary indicator denoting whether ex-combatants in the municipality receive protection from a state entity.	ARN survey (Q130: "Do you currently receive protection from a state entity?")
Ex-combatants resettled	Municipal-level number of resettled FARC ex-combatants.	ARN survey / administrative records
Collective projects	Municipal-level number of ex-combatants working in collective economic projects.	ARN survey (Q111–Q112: participation in an initiative or productive venture)
Civilian collaboration	Municipal-level number of ex-combatants collaborating with civilians in economic projects (non-collective).	ARN survey (Q116: do the initiatives involve people from the community?)
Population	Total municipal population (baseline year 2016).	DANE
Homicides	Annual count of homicides in the pre- and post-conflict period (2012–2020).	Colombia's National Police (SIEDCO)
Urban/rural	Binary indicator for city vs. non-city classification.	DANE
Coca	Logarithm of cultivated area of coca (hectares), baseline in 2016.	UNODC, Global Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme (SIMCI)

Table 1 (continued)

Variables	**Variable Description**	**Source**
Institutional performance	Index of municipal performance (baseline 2016).	DNP / DANE (*Desempeño Municipal*)
Ex-combatant presence	Dummy variable for whether the municipality hosts any ex-combatants.	ARN survey
Insurgent attacks 2016	Count of violent incidents perpetrated by insurgent actors in 2016.	ViPAA (Violent Presence of Armed Actors in Colombia)
Government attacks 2016	Count of violent incidents attributed to state forces in 2016.	ViPAA
IDP arrivals	Number of internally displaced persons (arrivals) registered since 2016.	Unidad para las Víctimas (RNI)

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics

	Category	**Overall (N=990)**
Ex-combatants assassinated	Mean (SD)	0.234 (1.02)
	Median [Min, Max]	0 [0, 15]
Protection by the state	1	119 (12.0%)
	0	871 (88.0%)
Ex-combatant presence	1	525 (53.0%)
	0	465 (47.0%)
Ex-combatants resettled	Mean (SD)	12.1 (43.4)
	Median [Min, Max]	1.00 [0, 743]
Collective project	Mean (SD)	3.93 (17.3)
	Median [Min, Max]	0 [0, 188]
Civilian collaboration	Mean (SD)	2.23 (9.97)
	Median [Min, Max]	0 [0, 142]
Homicides	Mean (SD)	12.5 (64.6)
	Median [Min, Max]	3.00 [0, 1,290]
Coca	Mean (SD)	147 (979)
	Median [Min, Max]	0 [0, 23,100]
Population	Mean (SD)	48,500 (287,000)
	Median [Min, Max]	15,500 [1,100, 7,980,000]
Institutional capacity	Mean (SD)	48.0 (9.98)
	Median [Min, Max]	47.3 [21.8, 83.2]
Insurgent attacks 2016	Mean (SD)	0.331 (1.55)
	Median [Min, Max]	0 [0, 22.0]
Government attacks 2016	Mean (SD)	0.724 (2.92)
	Median [Min, Max]	0 [0, 48.0]
IDP arrival 2016	Mean (SD)	160 (529)
	Median [Min, Max]	54.5 [0, 13,300]



Figure 1: Resettlement of Ex-Combatants in Colombian Municipalities.

Table 3: Correlation Matrix

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)
(1) Ex-combatants assassinated													
(2) Protection (0,1)	0.35***												
(3) Ex-combatants resettled	0.53***	0.51***											
(4) Collective projects	0.46***	0.49***	0.88***										
(5) Civilian collaboration	0.40***	0.47***	0.79***	0.90***									
(6) Total homicides (2017–2020)	0.35***	0.25***	0.56***	0.33***	0.36***								
(7) Non-ex-combatant homicides	0.35***	0.25***	0.56***	0.33***	0.36***	1.00***							
(8) Homicides 2016	0.30***	0.23***	0.55***	0.31***	0.35***	0.99***	0.99***						
(9) Coca 2016	0.61***	0.18***	0.26***	0.18***	0.19***	0.12***	0.12***	0.06					
(10) Population 2016	0.18***	0.20***	0.61***	0.34***	0.38***	0.87***	0.87***	0.88***	0.01				
(11) Institutional performance 2016	-0.05	0.04	0.06	-0.00	0.00	0.23***	0.23***	0.24***	-0.12***	0.22***			
(12) Insurgent attacks 2016	0.32***	0.20***	0.29***	0.16***	0.21***	0.31***	0.31***	0.28***	0.30***	0.28***	0.04		
(13) Government attacks 2016	0.35***	0.25***	0.50***	0.30***	0.35***	0.56***	0.56***	0.55***	0.26***	0.61***	0.11***	0.61***	
(14) IDP arrivals 2016	0.13***	0.21***	0.56***	0.31***	0.36***	0.71***	0.71***	0.73***	-0.02	0.87***	0.29***	0.23***	0.58***

Note: *$p < 0.05$; **$p < 0.01$; ***$p < 0.001$. Entries are Pearson correlations.

1.2. Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Models

We estimated the effects with zero-inflated negative binomial models, because the dependent variable is overdispersed (Cameron and Trivedi 2013). Figure 2 shows the cumulative count of ex-combatant assassinations in the post-conflict period. The histogram displays the square root of frequencies for the number of occurrences, showing the predominance of zero occurrences and the rapid decline in frequency as the number of occurrences increases. The red line and points overlay the distribution to emphasize the skewness of the data, characteristic of zero-inflated count data. Model diagnostics indicate that overdispersion is a major feature of the data. The goodness-of-fit test strongly rejects a Poisson distribution, whereas the negative binomial distribution fits well (Likelihood Ratio $X^2 = 9.52$, df $= 9$, $p = 0.391$).

Table 4 reports zero-inflated negative binomial models of ex-combatant assassinations. All specifications include the same municipal-level controls: logged population, coca cultivation, homicide levels, institutional performance, insurgent and government attacks, and logged IDP arrivals. Across the count component of the models, the estimated effects of community-based reintegration are consistently positive and statistically significant. The number of ex-combatants in a municipality is strongly associated with higher assassination counts (Model 1), and both collective projects and civilian collaboration are also associated with substantially higher assassination counts (Models 2–3). These results are consistent with the argument that reintegration activities that increase ex-combatants' visibility and engagement in local communities are associated with greater exposure to selective violence.

The interaction models provide evidence that protection systematically offsets this risk. While the interaction between protection and the number of ex-combatants is not statistically distinguishable from zero (Model 4), the interaction terms for collective projects and civilian collaboration are negative and statistically significant (Models 5–6), suggesting that protection moderates the association between highly visible community-based reintegration and assassination counts.

Table 5 reports Vuong tests comparing the zero-inflated negative binomial specification and the standard negative binomial model for the corresponding specification. The raw Vuong statistic is not significant, and the AIC- and BIC-corrected tests favor the standard negative binomial model, suggesting limited empirical support for zero inflation once model complexity is penalized. We hence reported the negative binomial models in the main manuscript.



Figure 2: Cumulative count of ex-combatant assassinations in Colombia (2016-2020). The histogram displays the square root of frequencies for the number of occurrences, highlighting the predominance of zero occurrences and the rapid decline in frequency as the number of occurrences increases. The red line and points overlay the distribution to emphasize the skewness of the data, characteristic of zero-inflated count data.

Table 4: Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Estimates of Ex-Combatant Assassinations

Dependent Variable: Ex-Combatant Assassinations						
Count Models	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**
Ex-combatants (log)	0.78***			0.82***		
	(0.07)			(0.10)		
Collective project (log)		0.74***			0.93***	
		(0.07)			(0.13)	
Civilian collaboration (log)			0.85***			1.09***
			(0.09)			(0.16)
Protection				1.00	1.01**	1.10**
				(0.58)	(0.38)	(0.37)
Ex-combatants (log) × protection				-0.22		
				(0.15)		
Coll. project (log) × protection					-0.44**	
					(0.17)	
Civilian collab. (log) × protection						-0.56**
						(0.19)
Population 2016 (log)	-0.28	-0.23	-0.14	-0.28	-0.29	-0.23
	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.18)
Coca 2016 (log)	0.23***	0.29***	0.35***	0.23***	0.27***	0.33***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Institutional performance 2016	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Homicides 2016 (log)	0.50***	0.63***	0.50**	0.49***	0.64***	0.54***
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Insurgent attacks 2016	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Government attacks 2016	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
IDP arrivals 2016 (log)	-0.05	-0.05	-0.03	-0.06	-0.05	-0.03
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Intercept	-1.62	-1.48	-2.38	-1.80	-1.13	-1.78
	(1.48)	(1.48)	(1.54)	(1.48)	(1.45)	(1.50)
Log(theta)	0.10	0.04	-0.23	0.19	0.15	-0.06
	(0.29)	(0.47)	(0.25)	(0.31)	(0.57)	(0.27)
Zero-Inflation Models						
Intercept	-11.08	-4.26	-11.35	-9.88	-5.44	-13.49
	(191.80)	(6.76)	(150.52)	(277.97)	(28.50)	(392.15)
Observations	990	990	990	990	990	990

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Dependent Variable: Ex-Combatant Assassinations (continued)						
Count Models	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**
Log-Likelihood	-321.72	-330.42	-334.82	-320.30	-326.46	-330.01
AIC	665.44	682.85	691.64	666.61	678.91	686.02

Note: $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{***}p < 0.001$

Table 5: Vuong Test Results: Comparison of the zero-inflated and the negative binomial models

Metric	**Vuong z-Statistic**	**Model Comparison**	**p-value**
Raw	-0.0932	`zinb` > `negbin`	0.4629
AIC-Corrected	4.1188	`negbin` > `zinb`	1.9045×10^{-5}
BIC-Corrected	14.4332	`negbin` > `zinb`	$< 2.22 \times 10^{-16}$

1.3. Logit Models

To assess the robustness of our results to alternative outcome definitions, we estimate logit models using a binary indicator for whether at least one ex-combatant assassination occurred in a municipality during the post-conflict period. This is a particularly strict test because it collapses the outcome to the occurrence of a single assassination, thereby discarding variation in the intensity of violence and focusing only on the extensive margin.

Table 6 reports the estimates. Across specifications, visible forms of reintegration are strongly associated with a higher likelihood of at least one assassination. The number of resettled ex-combatants is positive and significant (Model 1: $\beta = 1.07$, $p < 0.001$), and both collective economic projects and civilian collaboration are also positive and significant (Models 2–3: $\beta = 1.03$ and $\beta = 1.16$, respectively, $p < 0.001$). When interacted with state protection, the moderation terms are negative for both collective projects and civilian collaboration (Models 5–6: $\beta = -0.51$ and $\beta = -0.56$, $p < 0.05$). These results are consistent with the argument that protection dampens the violence associated with heightened visibility. The interaction for the number of ex-combatants is negative but not significant (Model 4: $\beta = -0.18$).

These models are intentionally parsimonious. Because the dependent variable is rare and defined as the occurrence of a single assassination, including a large set of controls substantially reduces statistical leverage and makes it difficult to detect moderation in interaction terms. The control-less specifications therefore provide a conservative and transparent robustness check that isolates whether visibility alone is sufficient to predict the onset of selective violence, while the negative binomial count models in the main text retain the full set of controls and recover variation in the intensity of assassinations.

1.4. Instrumental Variable Estimation

As a robustness check for endogeneity, we estimate a two-stage IV model that instruments the municipal number of resettled ex-combatants with the average level of insurgent attacks from 2012–2016. The logic is that pre-accord insurgent activity predicts where reintegration clusters form but, conditional on controls for population, coca cultivation, prior homicides, institutional performance, government presence, and IDP arrivals, is not directly related to post-2016 assassinations. First-stage diagnostics in Table 7 show the instrument is relevant: the coefficient on average insurgent attacks is 0.09 ($p < 0.001$). In the second stage (negative binomial with a control-function term), the coefficient for the number of ex-combatants is 0.89 ($p < 0.001$), implying that a one-unit increase in the logged number of ex-combatants is associated with roughly a 2.43-fold increase in expected assassinations, holding other factors constant. Control variables behave as expected: coca cultivation and prior homicide levels are positively associated with assassination risk.

Table 6: Logit Estimates of Ex-Combatant Assassination (0,1)

Dependent Variable: Ex-Combatant Assassination (0,1)						
	(1)	**(2)**	**(3)**	**(4)**	**(5)**	**(6)**
Ex-combatants (log)	1.07***			1.16***		
	(0.09)			(0.13)		
Ex-combatants (log) × protection				-0.18		
				(0.24)		
Collective projects (log)		1.03***			1.23***	
		(0.09)			(0.17)	
Collective projects (log) × protection					-0.51*	
					(0.23)	
Civilian collaboration (log)			1.16***			1.32***
			(0.10)			(0.20)
Civilian collaboration (log) × protection						-0.56*
						(0.25)
Protection				0.38	1.09*	1.24**
				(0.87)	(0.48)	(0.43)
Constant	-4.32***	-3.16***	-3.04***	-4.45***	-3.32***	-3.21***
	(0.26)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.31)	(0.19)	(0.18)
Observations	990	990	990	990	990	990
Log Likelihood	-204.31	-234.69	-241.14	-203.83	-231.97	-237.46
Akaike Inf. Crit.	412.61	473.37	486.28	415.66	471.95	482.92

Note: *$p < 0.05$; **$p < 0.01$; ***$p < 0.001$

Table 7: First-Stage OLS and Second-Stage Negative Binomial Estimates of Ex-Combatant Assassinations

	First-Stage (OLS)	**Second-Stage (NB)**
Insurgent attacks 2012–2016	0.09^{***}	
	(0.02)	
Ex-combatants (log)		0.89^{***}
		(0.24)
First-stage residual		-0.11
		(0.24)
Population 2016 (log)	0.33^{***}	-0.31
	(0.06)	(0.19)
Coca 2016 (log)	0.14^{***}	0.22^{***}
	(0.02)	(0.05)
Institutional performance 2016	0.00	-0.01
	(0.00)	(0.01)
Homicides 2016 (log)	0.14^{**}	0.48^{**}
	(0.05)	(0.16)
Government 2016	0.04^{*}	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.03)
IDP arrivals 2016 (log)	0.02	-0.06
	(0.02)	(0.06)
Intercept	-2.68^{***}	-1.37
	(0.51)	(1.58)
Observations	990	990
R^2 / Adj. R^2	0.34 / 0.33	
Log Likelihood		-321.83
AIC		663.66
BIC		712.64

Notes: $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$.

1.5. The Impact of Reintegration on Post-Conflict Armed Activity

To assess whether the presence of ex-combatants increases the likelihood of attacks by armed groups, we draw on the Violent Presence of Armed Actors in Colombia (ViPAA) dataset (Osorio et al. 2019). The ViPAA dataset compiles an archive of human rights violations reported across Colombian municipalities, with each entry representing a single act of violence - such as threats, torture, beatings, rape, forced displacement, arson, or killings - perpetrated by an identifiable armed actor in a given municipality-year. We focus on disaggregated data on violent acts attributed to FARC dissidents and BACRIM (criminalized former paramilitaries) during the post-conflict period (2017–2019), which is the most recent interval for which these data are available. We compute the average number of violent incidents involving each group during this period at the municipal level. These measures allow us to test whether municipalities hosting ex-combatants are more likely to experience attacks by rival armed actors, further probing the vulnerability that follows collective demobilization.

Table 8 presents negative binomial estimates of the relationship between ex-combatant presence and attacks perpetrated by FARC dissidents (Model 1) and BACRIM (Model 2) during the post-conflict period (2017–2019). Across both outcomes, ex-combatant presence strongly predicts more post-conflict attacks. The coefficient on $\log(\text{Ex-combatants} + 1)$ is positive and statistically significant for dissident attacks ($b = 0.40$, $p < 0.001$) and for BACRIM attacks ($b = 0.31$, $p < 0.001$), suggesting that municipalities with higher concentrations of resettled ex-combatants experience more armed-group activity. Control variables behave in line with expectations: coca cultivation is positively associated with dissident attacks ($b = 0.21$, $p < 0.001$), while prior homicide levels are positively associated with BACRIM attacks ($b = 0.56$, $p < 0.001$). In contrast, population size, institutional performance, and IDP arrivals do not exhibit systematic associations across models.

Table 8: Negative Binomial Estimates of Dissident and BACRIM Attacks (2017–2019)

Dependent variable:	**FARC dissident attacks**	**BACRIM attacks**
	(1)	(2)
Ex-combatants (log)	0.40***	0.31***
	(0.08)	(0.06)
Population (log)	0.11	-0.03
	(0.20)	(0.15)
Coca 2016 (log)	0.21***	0.06
	(0.04)	(0.03)
Institutional performance 2016	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Homicides 2016 (log)	0.21	0.56***
	(0.16)	(0.13)
Insurgent attacks 2016	0.08**	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Government attacks 2016	0.01	0.03*
	(0.02)	(0.02)
IDP arrivals 2016 (log)	-0.01	-0.00
	(0.07)	(0.06)
Constant	-4.22*	-2.79*
	(1.65)	(1.21)
Observations	990	990
Log Likelihood	-220.91	-367.17
AIC	461.82	754.35
BIC	510.80	803.32

Notes: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

2. Individual-Level Study

2.1. Descriptive Statistics

Tables 9, 10, and 11 show descriptive statistics and correlations in the individual-level data. The data have minimal missing values across variables, with most missingness below 2.5%. Key outcome variables, such as reporting to the state, military/police, or local actors, have negligible missingness (0.0%–0.1%). Among explanatory variables, protection by the state and civilian collaboration exhibit slightly higher missingness (2.4% and 1.5%, respectively), while control variables like gender, friends, and age also show minor gaps (0.5%–2.2%). The small proportion of missing values is unlikely to bias results significantly when employing listwise deletion. In Table 11, the correlation between *report state* and *report military/police* is quite high, which is expected because *report military/police* is a subset of *report state*. Other relationships of interest include moderate correlations between collective projects and civilian collaboration. We test the models for multicollinearity in the next subsections.

Table 9: Variable Descriptions and Data Sources

Variables	**Variable Description**	**Source**
Report to the state	Binary variable indicating whether ex-combatants report security threats to state institutions such as the military, the Carpa Azul (demobilization camps' support tent), the Defensoría del Pueblo (Ombudsman's Office), the Fiscalía General de la Nación (Attorney General's Office), the Policía Nacional (National Police), local police inspectors, or the Unidad Nacional de Protección (National Protection Unit, UNP).	ARN Survey, Question 129
Report to the military/police	Binary variable indicating whether ex-combatants report security threats specifically to the military or police	ARN Survey, Question 129
Report to local/non-state actors	Binary variable indicating whether ex-combatants report security threats to local, non-state actors, such as friends, family members, local leaders, religious or spiritual authorities, or ethnic authorities (e.g., cabildos or community councils)	ARN Survey, Question 129
Protection by the state	Binary variable indicating whether ex-combatants received protection measures from the state (*¿Actualmente cuenta con medidas de protección por parte de alguna entidad del Estado?*)	ARN Survey, Question 130
Collective reintegration	Binary variable indicating whether ex-combatants participate in collective reintegration projects	ARN Survey, Question 112

Table 9: (continued)

Variables	**Variable Description**	**Source**
Civilian collaboration	Binary variable indicating whether ex-combatants collaborate with civilians in productive ventures	ARN Survey, Question 116
Age	Continuous variable indicating the age of the respondent in years	ARN Survey
Male	Binary variable indicating gender, coded as 1 for male and 0 for female	ARN Survey, Question 20
Education	Binary variable indicating whether the respondent completed secondary education	ARN Survey, Question 88
Friends	Binary variable indicating whether the respondent has two or more friends	ARN Survey, Question 84
Married	Binary variable indicating marital status, coded as 1 for married or in a union and 0 otherwise	ARN Survey, Question 36
Employed	Binary variable indicating whether the respondent is employed or participates in productive activities	ARN Survey, Questions 111, 119, 121
Disability	Binary variable indicating whether the respondent has a disability	ARN Survey, Question 65
Government economic support	Binary variable indicating whether the respondent receives economic support from national or regional governments	ARN Survey, Question 113
International economic support	Binary variable indicating whether the respondent receives economic support from international organizations	ARN Survey, Question 113

Table 10: Descriptive Statistics

	Category	**Overall (N=12,138)**
Report to the state	0	5768 (47.5%)
	1	6368 (52.5%)
	Missing	2 (0.0%)
Report to the military/police	0	7233 (59.6%)
	1	4903 (40.4%)
	Missing	2 (0.0%)
Report to local/non-state	0	9800 (80.7%)
	1	2335 (19.2%)
	Missing	3 (0.0%)
Protection by the state	0	11390 (93.8%)
	1	455 (3.7%)
	Missing	293 (2.4%)
Collective reintegration	0	8219 (67.7%)
	1	3919 (32.3%)
Civilian collaboration	0	9725 (80.1%)
	1	2226 (18.3%)
	Missing	187 (1.5%)
Age	Mean (SD)	39.9 (11.1)
	Median [Min, Max]	38.0 [20.0, 93.0]
	Missing	58 (0.5%)
Male	0	3074 (25.3%)
	1	8941 (73.7%)
	Missing	123 (1.0%)
Education	0	9773 (80.5%)
	1	2365 (19.5%)
Friends	0	1121 (9.2%)
	1	10850 (89.4%)
	Missing	167 (1.4%)
Married	0	3891 (32.1%)
	1	8154 (67.2%)
	Missing	93 (0.8%)
Employed	0	5805 (47.8%)
	1	6066 (50.0%)
	Missing	267 (2.2%)
Disability	0	10634 (87.6%)
	1	1242 (10.2%)
	Missing	262 (2.2%)
Government economic support	0	10911 (89.9%)
	1	1227 (10.1%)
International economic support	0	10967 (90.4%)
	1	1171 (9.6%)

Table 11: Correlations Matrix for Individual-Level Variables

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
1. Report state		0.81***	-0.17***	0.09***	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.03*	0.08***	0.03*	0.10***	0.03*	-0.01	0.01
2. Report mil/pol			-0.13***	0.01	-0.05**	-0.04**	-0.02	-0.05**	0.08***	0.03	0.05**	0.02	-0.00	0.01
3. Report local				-0.02	0.18***	0.09***	-0.03	0.08***	-0.10***	0.02	-0.03	0.04**	0.00	0.02
4. Protection					0.09***	0.05***	-0.02	0.08***	0.08***	0.00	0.11***	-0.00	0.03*	0.01
5. Coll. projects						0.18***	0.18***	0.27***	-0.10***	-0.09***	0.01	0.11***	-0.04*	-0.01
6. Civ. collab.							0.01	0.14***	0.00	0.03*	0.08***	0.05***	-0.01	0.03
7. Gov support								0.09***	-0.03	-0.01	-0.02	0.05***	-0.00	-0.03*
8. Int'l support									-0.05***	-0.03	-0.05**	0.04**	-0.02	0.02
9. Age										0.20***	-0.08***	0.04**	-0.06***	0.09***
10. Male											-0.09***	0.04**	-0.03	0.11***
11. Education												-0.01	-0.02	-0.04**
12. Friends													-0.01	0.03*
13. Married														-0.03
14. Disability														

2.2. Logit Models with Alternative Controls

We fitted alternative models to test the robustness of our results by including additional control variables - *political participation*, *perceived risk*, and engagement in *independent ventures*. *Political participation* reflects whether ex-combatants engaged with political movements before the 2016 Peace Agreement, capturing pre-existing trust or distrust in institutional processes, which may shape ex-combatants' reliance on state versus local actors for security. *Perceived risk* measures whether ex-combatants or their families felt threatened because of being in the reintegration program, with higher perceived risk potentially driving a preference for local actors due to proximity or state actors if protection mechanisms are trusted. Finally, engagement in *independent ventures* codes whether ex-combatants have control over their finances, a factor that could indicate autonomy and confidence in navigating institutional processes, influencing their likelihood of engaging with state entities for protection (Sharif 2023).

The results presented in Table 12 demonstrate that the key findings are robust to the inclusion of alternative control variables: across all models, state protection remains a significant predictor of ex-combatants reporting security threats to the state and to the military/police. The negative relationship between state protection and reliance on local actors in Model 6 remains consistent, albeit slightly attenuated. While coefficient for *political participation* is not significant across models, its inclusion ensures robustness against potential omitted variable bias. *Perceived risk* significantly reduces reporting to military/police actors (Model 4) while increasing reliance on local actors (Model 6), suggesting that security concerns shape ex-combatants' preferences for protection. Finally, being in *independent ventures* is a significant negative predictor of reporting to local actors (Model 6), indicating that economically self-sufficient ex-combatants are less likely to rely on non-state networks for security.

Table 13 displays the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) values for the explanatory variables across the three main models reported in the main manuscript (Model 1: Reporting to the State; Model 2: Reporting to Military/Police; Model 4: Reporting to Local Actors). The VIF values for all variables are low, suggesting that multicollinearity is not a significant concern in these models. Variables such as *collective project* and *employed* show slightly higher VIF values (around 2.5), suggesting some moderate correlation with other predictors, but this does not exceed problematic levels. Thus, estimated coefficients are not substantially inflated due to multicollinearity.

2.3. Matching and Sensitivity Analysis

An alternative hypothesis to our main finding is that ex-combatants who report security threats to the state are inherently more likely to receive state protection. For instance, those perceiving greater local threats may both seek protection and be more likely to report threats, introducing potential bias. This suggests that the observed relationship between protection and reporting to the state could be driven by self-selection rather than the provision of security itself. To address this concern, we implemented propensity score matching (PSM) and coarsened exact matching (CEM) to ensure that protected and unprotected ex-combatants were comparable on key covariates likely to influence both the receipt of protection and the

Table 12: Logit Estimates of Ex-Combatant Reliance on State and Non-State Entities for Security Provision

	State		**Military/Police**		**Local Actors**	
Logit models	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**
State protection	0.825***	0.744***	0.848***	0.856***	-0.016	-0.340*
	(0.105)	(0.114)	(0.098)	(0.106)	(0.122)	(0.135)
Coll. projects		0.047		0.086.		0.646***
		(0.051)		(0.051)		(0.062)
Civilian collab.		-0.024		-0.117.		0.519***
		(0.061)		(0.062)		(0.069)
Pol. participation		0.051		-0.174		0.273
		(0.141)		(0.142)		(0.171)
Risk		-0.061		-0.146***		0.225***
		(0.041)		(0.041)		(0.052)
Independent		-0.164.		-0.055		-0.304**
		(0.097)		(0.098)		(0.117)
Age		0.012***		0.005*		-0.016***
		(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.002)
Male		0.126**		0.116*		0.287***
		(0.046)		(0.047)		(0.061)
Education		0.446***		0.332***		-0.150*
		(0.051)		(0.050)		(0.066)
Friends		0.141*		0.268***		0.423***
		(0.067)		(0.070)		(0.101)
Married		-0.024		-0.058		0.041
		(0.042)		(0.042)		(0.054)
Disability		0.058		0.065		-0.121
		(0.065)		(0.065)		(0.085)
Intercept	0.070***	-0.531***	-0.424***	-0.858***	-1.441***	-1.615***
	(0.019)	(0.137)	(0.019)	(0.140)	(0.024)	(0.179)
observations	11,845	10,737	11,845	10,737	11,844	10,737
AIC	16328	14673	15905	14347	11567	9957

Note: $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{***}p < 0.001$

Table 13: Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) Values for Independent Variables

Variable	**Model 1**	**Model 2**	**Model 4**
Protection	1.03	1.04	1.04
Collective project	2.58	2.53	2.42
Civilian collaboration	1.50	1.49	1.47
Government financial support	1.22	1.21	1.14
International financial support	1.29	1.28	1.24
Employed	2.02	1.98	1.97
Age	1.06	1.06	1.06
Gender	1.05	1.05	1.05
Education	1.03	1.03	1.03
Friends	1.01	1.01	1.01
Married	1.01	1.01	1.00
Disability	1.02	1.02	1.02

propensity to report threats (Rosenbaum 2017; King and Nielsen 2019).

We first applied nearest-neighbor matching without replacement to balance treated and control samples across key covariates: *age*, *education*, *insecurity*, and *employment* status. Table 14 summarizes the balance before matching, highlighting substantial initial imbalances in standardized mean differences, particularly for variables like *insecurity* (0.7026) and *employment* (0.7434). Using logistic regression, we estimated propensity scores for each ex-combatant based on these covariates and applied nearest-neighbor matching without replacement to create a balanced sample. Table 16 provides details on the sample sizes, with 443 treated and 443 matched controls retained, discarding 10,578 unmatched controls. Post-matching, as shown in Table 15, the balance improved, with all standardized mean differences below 0.02 and variance ratios close to 1, indicating near-perfect comparability.

After matching, we fit a logistic regression model on the matched observations to estimate the effect of protection. Table 17 shows significant treatment effects: the odds of reporting security threats to the state were 2.1 times higher for protected ex-combatants compared to those without protection (z=5.239, p¡0.001). To test the robustness of these findings to unmeasured confounding, we conducted sensitivity analysis using Rosenbaum bounds (Rosenbaum 2002). The results, visualized in Figure 4, suggests that the effect of protection remains robust to moderate hidden bias ($\Gamma = 2$), with lower bounds on the p-value remaining below the conventional threshold of 0.05. Beyond $\Gamma = 3$, the lower bounds approach 0. These results suggest the robustness of the findings to reasonable levels of bias.

2.4. Alternative Matching and Sensitivity Analysis

Due to limitations of propensity score matching, particularly its tendency to approximate random rather than blocked designs and increase imbalance (King and Nielsen 2019), we implemented coarsened exact matching (CEM). This approach ensures covariate balance by grouping observations into discrete bins before matching, which effectively reduces imbal-

Table 14: Summary of Balance for All Data (Pre-Matching)

Variable	Tr. mean	Ct. mean	Mean diff.	V. ratio	eCDF mean	eCDF max
Insecurity	0.5034	0.1521	0.7026	–	0.3513	0.3513
Age	44.0587	39.7286	0.4017	0.9548	0.0651	0.1860
Education	0.3792	0.1876	0.3951	–	0.1917	0.1917
Employed	0.7991	0.5012	0.7434	–	0.2979	0.2979

Table 15: Summary of Balance for Matched Data

Variable	Tr. mean	Ct. mean	Mean diff.	V. ratio	eCDF mean	eCDF max
Insecurity	0.5034	0.5079	-0.0090	–	0.0045	0.0045
Age	44.0587	43.8646	0.0180	1.0172	0.0029	0.0068
Education	0.3792	0.3747	0.0093	–	0.0045	0.0045
Employed	0.7991	0.8014	-0.0056	–	0.0023	0.0023

Table 16: Sample Sizes for Matching Procedure

Sample	Treated	Control
All	443	11,021
Matched	443	443
Unmatched	0	10,578
Discarded	0	0

Table 17: Logistic Regression Results on Matched Data

Variable	Estimate	Std. Error	z-value
Intercept	0.1583	0.0953	1.661
Protection	0.7422	0.1417	5.239***

Note: ***$p < 0.001$.



Figure 3: The odds ratio of 2.0 (95% confidence interval: 1.5 to 2.7) for the effect of protection on the likelihood of ex-combatants reporting security threats to the state is shown, with the dashed horizontal line at 1.0 indicating the null hypothesis of no effect, suggesting that state protection significantly increases the probability of reporting threats to state agents.



Figure 4: Rosenbaum Bounds Sensitivity Analysis: The plot shows that the effect of protection on reporting security threats remains robust to hidden bias up to a Gamma value of approximately 2, beyond which significance is lost.

ance while retaining a larger sample size. The matching procedure resulted in a perfect balance across the covariates of interest: *age*, *education*, *insecurity*, and *employed*. Table 18

presents the sample sizes before and after matching. 443 treated observations were matched to 10,486 controls, yielding an effective sample size of 2,712. Table 19 shows the balance diagnostics, demonstrating standardized mean differences close to zero across all covariates in the matched sample. CEM improved covariate balance compared to propensity score matching, while retaining a larger sample size. We then fitted a logistic regression model on the matched sample to estimate the treatment effect. Table 20 reports the regression results, showing that protection significantly increases the likelihood of ex-combatants reporting security threats to the state. The estimated odds ratio is 2.26 (95% CI: 1.95–2.60, $p < 0.001$).

Table 18: Sample Sizes After Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM)

Group	**Treated**	**Control**
All	443	11,021
Matched	443	10,486
Unmatched	0	535
Discarded	0	0

Table 19: Covariate Balance After Coarsened Exact Matching

Covariate	**Treated Mean**	**Control Mean**	**Std. Mean Diff.**
Insecurity	0.5034	0.5034	0.000
Age	44.06	43.93	0.012
Education	0.3792	0.3792	0.000
Employed	0.7991	0.7991	-0.000

Table 20: Logistic Regression Results for Reporting State Threats

Variable	**Estimate**	**Std. Error**	***p*-value**
Intercept	0.08397	0.01955	< 0.001
Protection	0.81657	0.10663	< 0.001
Odds Ratio (Protection)	2.26 (95% CI: 1.95–2.60)		

2.5. Multinomial Logit Models

Because respondents could select multiple reporting channels, our binary logits (state, military/police, non-state) are not mutually exclusive. To probe whether overlap drives the main results, we add a multinomial logit over four categories: *State only*, *Non-state only*, *Both*, and *Neither*. Table 21 reports descriptive statistics and Table 22 shows estimates of reporting choice relative to the *Neither* baseline. Receiving protection from the state is strongly associated with choosing the state when it is the sole channel ($\beta = 0.778$, $p < 0.001$) and with choosing both state and non-state actors ($\beta = 0.690$, $p < 0.001$), but not with selecting only non-state actors ($\beta = 0.213$, $p = 0.260$). Employment is positively related to all

three non-baseline categories, with especially large coefficients for *Non-state only* and *Both*, suggesting economically active respondents are more likely to report to someone rather than no one. These results suggest that protection shifts reporting behavior toward the state (especially *State only* and *Both*).

Table 21: Distribution of Reporting Categories

Category	**Count**	**Share (%)**
Neither	3,888	32.03
State only	4,745	39.09
Non-state only	1,879	15.48
Both	1,623	13.37
Total	12,135	100.00

Notes: Categories are constructed as `Neither` (`state` $= 0$, `non-state` $= 0$), `State only` $(1, 0)$, `Non-state only` $(0, 1)$, and `Both` $(1, 1)$, based on the coding in the text. Rows with missing values in either indicator are excluded from this tabulation. Shares may not sum to exactly 100 due to rounding.

Table 22: Multinomial Logit of Reporting Channels (Reference: *Neither*)

	State only	**Non-state only**	**Both**
Protection	0.778***	0.213	0.690***
	(0.142)	(0.189)	(0.170)
Employed	0.340***	1.360***	1.289***
	(0.047)	(0.064)	(0.068)
Age	0.005*	-0.024***	-0.002
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Male	0.146**	0.133	0.188*
	(0.054)	(0.070)	(0.075)
Education	0.319***	-0.235**	0.386***
	(0.060)	(0.083)	(0.079)
Friends	0.160*	0.393***	0.747***
	(0.075)	(0.110)	(0.133)
Married	-0.111*	-0.190**	-0.114
	(0.050)	(0.064)	(0.068)
Disability	0.056	0.013	0.061
	(0.077)	(0.102)	(0.105)
Intercept	-0.401***	-0.804***	-2.340***
	(0.117)	(0.162)	(0.185)
Observations		11,018	
Log Likelihood		-13,722	

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Outcome categories: *Neither* (reference), *State only*, *Non-state only*, *Both*.

3. Qualitative Evidence

To explore mechanisms for effective community-based reintegration, we engaged in participant observation in Colombia (January 2017 - June 2022) and conducted approximately 200 interviews in various regions where ex-combatants had settled. Our methodology is particularly suited for examining understudied, complex phenomena that require nuanced contextualized analysis (Van Evera 1997). Heuristic case studies of this kind inductively identify new variables, hypotheses, and causal mechanisms (George and Bennett 2005). The research participants included FARC ex-combatants, civilians and social leaders, FARC members of Colombia's Congress, as well as UN officials in Colombia and at the UN Headquarters in New York. We explored the impact of state protection, the goals of collective reintegration, and the impact of ex-combatant collaboration with civilian communities. Of particular focus in discussions with civilians were the advantages and disadvantages of hosting a group of ex-combatants in a particular municipality.

3.1. Ethical Concerns in Research with Human Interlocutors

This study received Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval from the Graduate Center of the City University of New York and Universidad Javeriana Cali. We adhered to the IRB protocol and diligently addressed ethical and safety concerns while considering the potential societal benefits of conducting face-to-face interviews. Our approach included conducting a pilot study, during which we sought guidance and expertise from our field research managers, as well as consulting with local security, political, and traditional leaders in Cauca, Valle de Cauca, and Caquetá. In designing our study, we also adhered to the "Principles and Guidance for Human Subjects Research," approved by the American Political Science Association Council (2020). We had two main ethical considerations when conducting research involving human subjects within active conflict zones and among former combatants and civilian communities. These considerations encompass (1) preventing potential harm, and (2) preventing a breach of confidentiality of collected data.

Since our research included asking questions about the war-related and post-conflict violence, our foremost priority was to minimize the potential risks and harms to the interviewees. First, we sought participant's active and informed consent through a consent statement in the respondents' native language (Spanish), appropriate for lower literacy levels. In the consent statement, we explained the academic nature of the study and the potential benefits to the national and local politics of peacebuilding in Colombia and in other contexts. Participants did not sign the consent form on paper to ensure anonymity. Participants had the chance to ask questions or opt out of the study at any point during the interview. Second, we received real-time security updates about the camps and surrounding areas before traveling to the sites. This measure was to ensure the safety of the researchers and potential harm to interviewees. In case of reports regarding the presence of armed groups in the selected sites, travel was postponed to a later time until security conditions improved. We worked closely with the National Police of Colombia and the United Nations Political Mission so that we would receive notice of any security threats.

Third, discussing violent incidents and measures for self-protection undoubtedly brings about

emotional and psychological discomfort. We made clear to participants that they could stop the interview at any point in time or refuse to answer a question. We made clear to our interviewees that we understand the vehemence of their experiences and that they should consider the risk to themselves when responding to questions in this study that potentially has benefits for the larger ex-combatant and civilian communities in Colombia. In conversations after interviews, the participants mostly relayed to us a sense of empowerment through telling their story of victimization and efforts at self-protection. We had planned on referring interviewees for psychosocial support in case of traumatic distress during the interview, a situation which did not take place during the study.

Breach of confidentiality was our second principal concern. To minimize this risk, we only interviewed participants in safe/private spaces, such as homes or offices. We never met with participants or interview facilitators in town squares or in areas where their participation in the study could be made public. The authors are the sole persons with access to the data collected from participants. When disseminating the results of the research in scholarly form the authors took great care not to identify interview participants or stigmatize a community based on security-related decisions that individuals or the community had made. To protect the privacy of a collective as whole, some communities have processes for inclusion and involvement, or protocols for recruitment of interview subjects. Communities in this study did not have specific processes for inclusion and involvement. In each case, there were unwritten norms that the authors followed. For instance, sometimes the community did not like the inclusion of members who were social outcasts, such as alcoholics, because they thought information provided by them reflected badly on the community. We respected these norms, which differed in various regions of Colombia. Images for the Appendix were taken after obtaining consent. In some cases, ex-combatants or military personnel were photographed in a way that would not reveal their identities.

3.2. Interview Protocol

3.2.1 Interviews with FARC Congressmen and UN Officials

1. Why do you think such a high number of ex-combatants were assassinated since the 2016 Peace Agreement?
2. How did the FARC decide on the location of demobilization camps (ETCR)?
3. How did the FARC decide on the distribution of ex-combatants in demobilization camps?
4. How did the FARC decide how to resettle ex-combatants?
5. What are some of the security challenges you have encountered in municipalities with demobilization camps?
6. Some of the demobilization camps built many successful collective economic projects, while others had fewer of them. Why do you think that is the case?
7. What does it mean to build "peace" in the countryside?

8. (Only for UN officials) How do you support the demobilization camps when security threats are reported to you?
9. Lack of implementation in which aspects of the Peace Agreement has led to violence in areas where ex-combatants settled?

3.2.2 Interviews with Ex-Combatants

1. How have you experienced your reincorporation process after the settlement in the demobilization camp/municipality?
2. Why did you decide to run/join the cooperative?
3. If any, what were the main challenges and obstacles you have faced in the demobilization camp/municipality leading the cooperative?
4. What individual and collective actions have you taken to address those obstacles?
5. How important has the State been in your reincorporation process and the foundation/management of the cooperative?
6. Are there any civilians participating in the cooperative?
7. How do you think economic collaboration between ex-combatants and civilians has impacted their relations?
8. Do you think collaboration with civilians has increased ex-combatants' visibility in the countryside?

3.2.3 Interviews with Civilians

1. Has the 2016 Peace Agreement and the settlement of ex-combatants changed the security dynamics in your community?
2. Has the presence of ex-combatants improved/deteriorated the security conditions in your community?
3. Has the presence of the demobilization camp improved/deteriorated the security situation in your municipality [mention name]?
4. Do you know anyone in your community who reports security threats to the police?
5. Why do you think civilians choose to report security threats?
6. Did you report security threats before ex-combatants were resettled in this area?
7. Has the presence of ex-combatants/camps created employment or other kinds of opportunities or benefits in your community?

3.3. Transitional Justice Court Request to Government

The following document is the official order by Colombia's transitional justice court (the Special Jurisdiction for Peace, JEP) for the government to investigate assassination of ex-combatants and security issues surrounding the demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants. The order contains detailed rulings about the mandatory involvement of various state agencies in protecting ex-combatants and their collective economic projects. It also demands the presence – in person – of various state officials with the demobilization and reintegration camps (ETCR) to hear about security issues. While the letter dates to 24 August 2021 and is outside the time boundaries of our quantitative analysis (2017-2020), we showcase it as evidence for the impact of collective action on activating state-led security initiatives. The order was prepared in early 2020, culminating a multitude of requests by ex-combatants and civilians for more security. Prior to JEP's order, demands for security had been responded to by the government, leading to a reduction in homicides. The translation into English of an abbreviated version of the Court's order is below.

SPECIAL JURISDICTION FOR PEACE - COURT FOR PEACE

TRIBUNAL OF FIRST INSTANCE FOR CASES OF LACK OF RECOGNITION OF TRUTH AND RESPONSIBILITY

Popayán, Cauca, 24 August 2021

Subject: Orders to Authorities Convened in the City of Popayán on August 24, 2021

I. ISSUE The Tribunal of First Instance for Cases of Lack of Recognition of Truth and Responsibility of the Court for Peace (hereinafter SAR) issues orders to some of the state authorities participating in the territorial hearing to monitor the situation of the population in the process of reintegration in the provinces of Cauca, Nariño, and Valle del Cauca, held in the city of Popayán on August 24, 2021.

II. BACKGROUND 1. On 29 April 2020, the SAR, through Ruling No. 057, took over the process of collective precautionary measures to protect the fundamental rights of the group of men and women from the armed forces and former FARC-EP members appearing before the JEP. 2. Regarding the territorial situation in the Southwest region composed of the provinces of Cauca, Valle del Cauca, and Nariño, the representatives of the Comunes political party, in a letter dated 3 June 2021, made observations about the security situation affecting the population of former FARC-EP combatants, among other things related to macrocases 01, 02, 05, and 07 investigating serious human rights violations known by the Truth Recognition, Responsibility, and Determination of Facts and Behaviors (SRVR) Chamber in the Southwest region. In said letter, they requested holding an in-person hearing in that region with former combatants, preceded by a coordination table for protective measures. 3. As a result, Ruling AT-101-2021 was issued on June 18, 2021, ordering a public hearing to monitor the security situation of former combatants in the process of reintegration in the provinces of Cauca, Nariño, and Valle del Cauca:

"FIRST: ORDER the holding of the in-person public hearing in the city of Popayán (Cauca) on Tuesday, 24 August 2021, from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.

SECOND: The magistracy will ATTEND on Wednesday, 25 August 2021, in the morning, the hearing in ETCR Dagoberto Ortíz, Monterredondo (Miranda, Cauca) and will INFORM its members about the progress in the handling of the precautionary measures assumed by SAR. This will be done in-person in the ETCR.

THIRD: SUMMON to the public hearing the officials of the state entities mentioned in paragraph 23 of this decision:

1. Presidential Adviser for Stabilization and Consolidation, Emilio José Archila Peñalosa. 2. Head of the Strategic Transition Joint Command (CCOET), Ministry of Defense, Brigadier General Javier Alberto Ayala Amaya. 3. Head of the Police Unit for Peacebuilding (UNIPEP), Colonel Fernando José Pantoja Cuéllar. 4. Deputy Prosecutor with Functions for Monitoring the Peace Agreement, Diana María Cadena Lozano. 5. Deputy Ombudsman for Risk Prevention and Early Warning System, Ricardo Arias Macias; National Director of Complaints Processing and Handling, Diana Margarita Silva Londoño, and Regional Ombudsman of Meta, Jhorman Julian Saldaña. 6. Director of the National Reintegration Agency (ARN) Andrés Felipe Stapper Segrera. 7. Governor of Cauca, Elías Larrahondo Carabalí. 8. Governor of Nariño, Jhon Rojas Cabrera. 9. Governor of Valle del Cauca, Clara Luz Roldán González FOURTH: SUMMON to the public hearing the spokespersons designated by the political party Comunes." 10. On 24 August 2021, between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., the hearing ordered through Ruling AT-101-2021 was held in the city of Popayán, with the participation of the convened authorities.

III. RULING FIRST: ORDER the Presidential Adviser for Stabilization and Consolidation, with the participation of the Ministry of Defense - Strategic Transition Joint Command, the Ministry of the Interior, the Police Unit for Peace Building (UNIPEP), the Agency for Reintegration and Normalization (ARN), the National Police, the Attorney General's Office - Special Investigation Unit (UEI), the Ombudsman's Office, the Governors of Cauca, Nariño, and Valle del Cauca, the National Protection Unit (UNP), and the Deputy Prosecutor with Functions for Monitoring the Peace Agreement, and with the participation of a representative of the Comunes Party from each province and the accompaniment of the UN Verification Mission, to convene a technical committee with the following objectives:

I) Present within thirty business days a strategy to ensure the comprehensive security of the reintegration process of former combatants located in the New Reintegration Areas (NAR) in the provinces of Cauca, Nariño, and Valle del Cauca. The strategy must include an implementation schedule and results. II) Design within thirty business days a comprehensive relocation strategy in dignified conditions for former combatants and their families in cases of imminent risk that have left the ETCRs, guaranteeing: (i) the protection of their life, freedom, health, integrity, and personal security, (ii) the right to collective protection, (iii) the right to education of minors within the displaced population's family nucleus, (iv) the right to decent housing, and (v) access to productive projects that enable them to generate income for their subsistence. The strategy must include an implementation schedule and results. III) Design within thirty business days a pilot plan for the implementation of the previous strategy in the municipality of Argelia (Cauca). The strategy must include an implementation schedule and results.

The Deputy Prosecutor with Functions for Monitoring the Peace Agreement will serve as the technical secretariat and must submit a report containing the results of the previous points and subsequent reports every two months on the main progress of the technical table.

SECOND: ORDER the Ministry of Defense, within thirty business days: I) To design and implement, through the National Police, special strategies for the protection of locations where productive projects of former combatants are being carried out in Nariño, Cauca, and Valle del Cauca. II) To implement a plan and security protocols for the accompaniment of the population that has left the ETCRs while being relocated. III) To design and implement pedagogical campaigns, taking into account the ethnic approach, to prevent the stigmatization of former combatants in the territories and to disseminate them through the National Police radio station and social networks in Nariño, Cauca, and Valle del Cauca.

THIRD: ORDER the Governors of Nariño, Cauca, and Valle del Cauca, along with the Territorial Peace Councils, within thirty business days: I) To design and implement a strategy to prevent the stigmatization of former combatants in these provinces and to promote reconciliation in territories that consider ethnic, gender, and territorial approaches. II) To design and implement a coordination mechanism to make effective rapid response measures provided for in Decree 2124 of 2017, in which a representative of the reintegrated population participates.

FOURTH: ORDER the Director of the National Reintegration Agency (ARN) to present within thirty business days: I) A plan for the process of access to property for the resettlement of the population of former combatants and the development of their productive projects with an analysis of comprehensive and preventive security in the provinces of Nariño, Cauca, and Valle del Cauca. II) The territorial update of the census of the reintegrated, along with the strategic lines of differential gender, ethnic, and territorial approaches, which must unify the figures recorded by different state entities in the provinces of Nariño, Cauca, and Valle del Cauca.

4. Visual Context from the Field

This section provides photographs from the field that situate the study's evidence in everyday post-conflict interactions among state agents and FARC ex-combatants. The images illustrate routine moments – shared recreation, collective work, and mobility under protection – that help contextualize the paper's quantitative results. Identifying features are minimized and faces are blurred to protect the privacy and safety of our interlocutors.

Figure 5: Colombian military personnel and FARC ex-combatants playing soccer together at the demobilization camp of Tierra Grata (Cesar, August 2019). These informal matches reveal perceivable levels of trust between former adversaries, despite decades of conflict. Photo by Sally Sharif.

Figure 6: Colombian soldiers and ex-combatants watching a televised soccer game together at the demobilization camp of Tierra Grata (Cesar, August 2019). Such shared recreational moments show everyday expressions of mutual recognition and coexistence in the post-conflict period. Photo by Sally Sharif.

Figure 7: Colombian military personnel washing their dishes after having lunch at the Agua Bonita camp, Montañita (Caquetá, June 2018). The restaurant, a collective hospitality project run by ex-combatants, employed civilians from surrounding villages. This integration reflects the evolving relationship between state agents, ex-combatants, and local communities when the state provides security in conditions of partial peace. Photo by Sally Sharif.

Figure 8: Bulletproof vehicles provided by the state for the safe transportation of ex-combatants. These vehicles are part of broader efforts to protect demobilized fighters from targeted attacks by dissident groups and other armed actors. Photo by Sally Sharif.

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